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ABSTRACT 
Commodity trading at both domestic and international levels involves many sources of 
supply chain risk and uncertainty. Risk management techniques are utilized by industry 
participants; however, there are unknown risks that can arise throughout the supply chain making 
effective risk management a difficult task. This study aims to address supply chain risk in 
soybean exports. A framework is created for a competitive bidding environment in which firms 
participate in an international import tender. Monte Carlo simulation is used to represent 
stochastic variables and derive an optimal bid under various scenarios. Sensitivity analysis is 
then conducted to measure the impact of key input variables on the output values. An alternative 
specification for risk management is also implemented into the framework. This study provides 
insight into supply chain uncertainty and incorporates that into a competitive bidding framework 
for optimal bid derivation and effective risk management.   
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Overview 
International grain trade has been and continues to be important to the United States’ 
(US) agricultural industry. An abundance of crops produced domestically combined with strong 
foreign demand creates at environment prime for global trade activity from the United States. A 
recent World Markets and Trade report released by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) predicts United States corn exports to tie a record set just a year ago. Wheat exports are 
down slightly but continue to grow over time. Although a trade war has recently ensued with 
China, the world’s largest importer of soybeans, international soybean trade remains of top 
priority in the agricultural industry and is now getting even more attention than ever before.  
Effective supply chain management in agriculture is a crucial component to the success 
of all parties involved in the supply chain. This starts with the flow of commodities at the farmer 
level and moves throughout various avenues of the supply chain to end with the consumer. 
Effectively managing commodities at each step of the supply chain creates a more efficient flow 
and trading process between firms.  
 Agricultural supply chains contain both known and unknown variables. Unknown 
variables within a supply chain expose participants to supply chain risk. This uncertainty can 
come in the form of unknown costs that are introduced with commodity procurement, logistics, 
and commodity sales. The impact of supply chain uncertainty is realized in inter-firm 
competition. Firms competing in a commodity trading environment can strategically place 
themselves in various ways in order to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. Some 
examples of risk mitigation techniques used by firms include commodity price hedging, 
transportation cost coverage, and anticipatory demurrage cost coverage.  
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The supply chain uncertainty in inter-firm competition is ultimately manifested in a 
competitive bidding environment. One way in which international trade transactions occur is 
through agricultural import tenders. Competition in the form of bidding plays an important role 
in the agricultural marketing industry and has two main functions: pricing and allocation (Wilson 
and Diersen, 1999). There is price discovery through the process of competitive bidding and 
adequate allocation occurs among suppliers. The firm/country seeking the commodity is in 
obvious need of it which creates a competitive trade opportunity for firms/countries looking to 
supply the commodity. Buyers also utilize auctions to promote competition among rivals and 
identify the low-cost supplier (Wilson and Dahl 2001). The competitive bidding process is one of 
if not the most efficient and effective way for a buyer to identify low-cost suppliers and create an 
environment of intense competition that allows the buyer to procure the commodity at the lowest 
possible cost.  
This procurement process acts as a reverse auction where a foreign country is seeking to 
import a large volume of a certain commodity and entertains bids from potential suppliers in 
order to procure the commodity. Some international tenders are more privatized than others, and 
some happen more frequently and consistently than others as well. The popularity of this type of 
procurement competition is likely due to the volume and value of the commodity looking to be 
procured, where even small occurrences of price volatility can have an extreme impact on total 
cost (Wilson and Diersen 1999).     
 1.2. Problem Statement  
From the perspective of the bidder, there are many forms of uncertainty that are 
introduced when seeking to submit a bid in the competitive bidding process. First, the 
prospective bidder may not be certain of his/her own cost structure. There may be price risk in 
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procurement of the commodity itself. The bidder would also have to assume risk in the 
transportation process throughout the supply chain which may have unknown variables. There is 
price volatility in the transportation process whether it be truck, barge, rail or vessel. There is 
also the potential for bottlenecks to occur within a supply chain which then exposes market 
participants to potential demurrage penalties.  
Second, there is also risk introduced from rival bidders. Because a majority of 
agricultural import tenders are sealed-bid auctions and remain fairly privatized, it is hard to gain 
information on the number of competitors and potential competitor bidding behavior. This 
creates uncertainty and potential risks that will have an impact on the optimal bid for any 
prospective bidder looking to participate in a tender.  
Lastly, a prospective bidder may have difficulty when deciding how to derive an optimal 
bid for the tender. It is difficult to encapsulate all costs and potential uncertainty within a supply 
chain, especially an international supply chain with more than one form of transportation and 
many working components. The combination of all moving parts with underlying supply chain 
and competitor risks makes optimal bid derivation a difficult task.  
1.3. Objectives 
There are 4 main objectives of this study which aim to address the problems and 
uncertainty that firms face when looking to participate in international import tenders. The 
objectives are:  
1. Accurately depict and measure the supply chain costs and uncertainty in which a 
potential bidder may experience when participating in an international soybean 
import tender.   
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2. Build a framework to accurately derive an optimal bid for a prospective bidder 
seeking participation in an international soybean import tender.  
3. Conduct sensitivity analysis to determine and measure the impact of key input 
variables on expected profit, the probability of wining, and the optimal bid.  
4. Introduce a risk measurement tool that can be used to measure and manage potential 
uncertainty when participating in the competitive bidding process.   
These objectives aim to help firms looking to participate in the competitive bidding 
process identify and measure the potential risks, costs, and supply chain uncertainty and derive 
an optimal bid based on that. The amount of uncertainty due to the lack of information, complex 
supply chain, and dynamic bidding environment, makes optimal bid derivation a complex 
process. In addition to that, the volume and value of the commodity in the competitive bidding 
process is extremely high relative to other grain trading transactions which makes this decision-
making process all the more important. An accurate supply chain depiction, cost valuation, and 
measurement of own and competitor uncertainty allows for precise optimal bid derivation and a 
higher chance of success in competitive bidding. 
1.4. Procedures 
First, a soybean supply chain is accurately developed from North Dakota (ND) to Asia. 
Historical costs are gathered for each component of the supply chain along with costs for other 
potential uncertainties. A profit-maximization model is created to derive the optimal bid for a 
prospective bidder seeking participation in an international soybean import tender.  
The main profit function follows that of the seminal work of Lawrence Friedman. The 
function is as follows:  
E(x) = (X – C) ۰ P(x) 
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E(x) is the expected profit returned for the firm. That is the value to be maximized. X is 
the optimal bid level at which the maximum expected profit is reached. C is the expected cost for 
the firm if they were to win the tender and supply the commodity. P(x) is the probability of 
winning the tender. This calculation is explained later in the study.  
The model is setup as a stochastic simulation-based model and is solved using Monte 
Carlo simulation. The program used for the model is @Risk, which is a Microsoft Excel add-in 
program. Monte Carlo Simulation is a technique used to measure the probability of outcomes 
that are otherwise difficult to predict due to stochastic variables. Simulations are set up in @Risk 
based on various model parameters and the program runs each simulation 10,000 times to 
generate an outcome or probability.   
An optimal bid is derived for a base case scenario and sensitivity analysis is then 
conducted. The sensitivity analysis is chosen for strategic variables that influence the optimal bid 
and overall expected profit. Lastly, an alternative specification for risk measurement is included 
as an additional tool which can be used for managerial and decision-making purposes within a 
firm.  
1.5. Organization 
Chapter 2 provides an explanation of the importance of supply chain management in 
agriculture and commodity trading. The chapter also depicts a soybean supply chain from North 
Dakota to the Pacific Northwest (PNW) and to a foreign destination (Asia). Supply chain costs 
are explained at each step of the supply chain. Potential risks in the supply chain are introduced 
in this chapter and risk mitigation techniques are also described. Lastly, previous studies 
pertaining to supply chain management and supply chain costs are highlighted.  
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Chapter 3 explains the competitive bidding process, types of auctions and winning 
variation environments. The chapter also highlights a formal program used in Egypt for 
international import tenders. Lastly, chapter 3 introduces previous literature about competitive 
bidding and specifies different modeling techniques used to represent the competitive bidding 
process.  
Chapter 4 introduces and explains the empirical model. The base case scenario is 
developed and explained in detail. The data used in the model along with its sources are also 
explained. Probability distribution functions, correlations between costs components and their 
significance are all explained in this chapter. Lastly, this chapter provides a scope and 
breakdown of the sensitivity analysis included in the study.  
Chapter 5 explains in detail the results of the base case along with all sensitivity analysis 
performed. This chapter aims to provide the impact that each sensitivity has on the optimal bid, 
probability of winning the tender, and expected firm profits. An explanation of why certain 
sensitivity analysis is done and the motivation for it is also explained in the chapter. Lastly, 
results are explained along with the impact of the alternative specification included in the model. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the study, highlights key results including that of the sensitivity 
analysis, and presents implications, limitations, and suggestions for further research.     
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CHAPTER 2. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on supply chain management, its purpose and its application to 
agriculture. A soybean supply chain from ND to Asia is depicted and each element of that supply 
chain is explained in detail. Supply chain elements include costs and risks at each stage. The 
costs and uncertainty arise from both commodity procurement and logistics. Risk mitigation 
strategies are also described when analyzing each cost and its associated uncertainty. The flow of 
agricultural commodities throughout the supply chain is portrayed along with studies relating to 
supply chain management and its application to agriculture. 
  Supply chain disruption risk is also analyzed, described and related to the agricultural 
industry in chapter 2. Various studies relating to supply chain disruption are explained. These 
include studies using many different modeling techniques to measure the cost of congestion. 
Industry examples of supply chain bottlenecks, congestion and demurrage penalties are also 
described in the chapter in order to build a picture of the effects that disruptions can have 
throughout the entire supply chain.  
2.2. Supply Chain Management 
Supply chain management is the practice of actively managing supply chain processes at 
each step of the supply chain in the most efficient manner possible. More specifically, in the 
agri-supply chain it might be the practice of managing grain from the field to a local elevator to a 
processer or even to the end consumer. Efficient timing is an important variable in the agri-
supply chain. For example, a soybean crush plant in China may purchase soybeans from a firm in 
the United States. This crush plant must rely on the industry participants in the United States to 
get the grain to the export facility in a timely manner. The crush plant must then have a vessel 
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ready to load the beans and bring them back to China in order to be processed into the final 
product. If the beans are late getting to the export facility, demurrage charges will be incurred, 
and the crush plant must devise an alternative plan due to the delay in receiving the product. This 
is a basic example but builds a picture to represent the importance of timing and convergence of 
many moving parts within the agri-supply chain.   
Transportation and commodity inventory are two critical components of supply chain 
management that also happen to be the most cost-absorbing (Ballou 1991). At the farm level, 
storage is an important asset that most farmers utilize. Harvest brings a large influx of grain at 
one time and that is often reflected by a decrease in cash market prices. It often makes sense for 
famers to store a portion of their grain with the anticipation that prices will increase in the 
coming months and the farmer will be able to retain a larger profit from storing and selling the 
grain in the post-harvest season. 
Application of supply chain models in agriculture becomes beneficial when studying 
uncertainties within the supply chain. A study done by Borodin et al. (2016) analyzed the 
previous work handling agricultural supply chain uncertainty. The agricultural industry itself is 
under increasing pressure to become as sustainable as possible and also to provide food, energy 
and industrial resources to satisfy the demand of a rising world population (Borodin et al. 2016). 
More specific to this study, the intense competition within the agribusiness industry forces each 
competing firm to become as efficient as possible in order to gain a competitive edge. One way 
in which firms increase efficiency is in the area of supply chain management.  
All different types of businesses in the agricultural industry are forced to make decisions 
under uncertainty. This is one of the main issues in the industry that poses all participants with 
risks. In upstream operations, agricultural producers are exposed to uncertainties in weather, 
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production, prices, capital availability, etc. Further downstream, firms are exposed to 
uncertainties in market price volatility, supply chain timing, supply chain disruptions, etc 
(Borodin et al. 2016). 
2.3. Supply Chain Depiction & Explanation 
Agricultural products flow through many steps of the supply chain before reaching the 
consumer. Figure 2.1 shows a depiction of a soybean supply chain starting at the producer level 
and ending with the consumer. Appropriate deviations are added at each phase of the supply 
chain in which the commodities intended use may alter the path. The supply chain elements in 
blue are the elements specific to this study. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 is another supply chain representation built by CHS in an article titled, 
“Anatomy of a Grain Trade”. Although the specific commodity in this supply chain is not 
synonymous with that in this study, the supply chain flow is identical. It is important to note the 
Figure 2.1. Supply Chain Depiction  
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modes of transportation that are used between each step in the supply chain. This includes 
primarily rail and vessel transportation. In the article, CHS grain traders comment on the 
importance of building a global supply chain network. Within that network, they mention the 
importance of relationship building along with risk exposure in the global supply chain. More 
specifically, the article addresses supply chain bottlenecks and the demurrage costs associated 
with that.   
 
 
Each step of the supply chain is important to the commodity flow and plays a unique role 
in moving grain throughout the supply chain. First, the commodity is grown at the farmer level. 
Once harvested, it is usually delivered to a country elevator or shuttle elevator. A country 
elevator is a grain facility located in a rural area. They primarily purchase grain from farmers and 
resell it to other market participants at a higher price in hopes to gain a profit. A shuttle elevator 
is the same as a country elevator except they have access to rail for delivery of grain. Most 
Figure 2.2. Anatomy of A Grain Trade (chsinc.com) 
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country elevators use trucks to transport their grain to other sources of transportation such as a 
railroad or barge. Next, the grain is transported by rail or barge to either a processing plant or an 
export terminal. A processing plant is a facility designed to transform the commodity into an end 
good that can be utilized by the consumer. An export terminal is a facility located near a port that 
stores and exports grain to foreign destinations. After being exported, the grain is then shipped 
overseas to a processing plant where it is transformed into a final product for consumers. After 
being processed, a majority of commodities are then sent to a distributor/retailer. The job of the 
distributer/retailer is to sell the final good to the consumer.  
Not all grain follows the exact same path through the supply chain. There are many 
factors that play unique roles in determining how grain moves throughout the supply chain. Type 
of commodity, distance from elevators/processing plants, demand, and price are just a few of 
these factors. For example, a farmer growing soybeans may be located near a crush plant. It may 
be more convenient or more profitable for the farmer to sell directly to the crush plant rather than 
to a country elevator. Another example would be a livestock owner purchasing grain for feed 
directly from a farmer (Landman 2017). 
Throughout each step of the agri-supply chain, industry players are constantly competing 
in an environment that is ever-changing and extremely complex. Grain must be shipped from 
areas in which it is produced in abundance, to areas with high demand. Grain industry 
participants must overcome obstacles such as changing market prices, changing prices in 
logistics and logistical timing in order to move that grain to end markets. Industry participants 
are dependent on each other to successfully move grain throughout the supply chain. For 
example, grain buyers depend on the transportation industry to assist in delivering their 
commodities to end-markets in a timely manner (Carlson 1999).  
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Country elevators primarily consist of farmer cooperatives (co-ops), private owners, or 
grain companies. They are located mainly in surplus farming regions where grain can easily be 
consolidated into one location. They are often located along a rail line or river for means of 
accessibility to various modes of transportation. The primary goal of an elevator is to purchase 
grain from farmers and redistribute it accordingly.  
After country elevators purchase the grain, the managers are faced with many decisions 
on what to do with it. The first decision is whether they should sell the grain immediately or 
store the grain in hopes to make a larger profit in the future. This decision is based on market 
conditions at that time along with strategic planning by the elevator managers. When carrying 
charges are positive, the market is giving elevators an incentive to store grain and sell it in the 
coming months. Positive carrying charge means the outward futures price is greater than that of 
the nearby. For example, if in the fall of the year the nearby soybean price is $10/bushel and the 
May soybean price for the next year is $12/bushel, then there would be an incentive to store the 
grain based on a few factors such as cost of storage, interest, etc. The opposite of that situation 
would be an inverted market. An example of an inverted market would be if in the fall of the 
year the nearby soybean price is $9/bushel and the May soybean price for the next year is 
$8/bushel, there wouldn’t technically be an incentive to store. However, dependent on market 
conditions and outlooks, managers may still decide to store the grain with the anticipations that 
prices will increase.  
The next decision that must be made is to decide to whom the elevator managers should 
sell their grain. Typically, elevators will sell their grain to processors, merchandisers or brokers. 
Transportation is a critical variable when making this decision. A majority of the time, the 
elevator will be in charge of the logistics of the grain to the next destination.  
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A processor is a company that purchases a raw commodity and transforms it into another 
product. An example of a processor would be an ethanol plant that purchases corn in order to 
produce ethanol. Merchandisers are companies larger than that of a country elevator. They buy 
and sell grain just as a country elevator does, but at a much larger scale and to different markets. 
Merchandisers buy grain from producers, country elevators, brokers, and other merchandisers. 
They make up a majority of the participants that compete in the international competitive bidding 
process. The reason for this is because they have the ability to transport grain and therefore sell it 
to foreign markets. The competitive bidding process will be discussed in further detail in chapter 
3.        
2.4. Supply Chain Costs and Risks 
A critical component of supply chain management deals with effectively measuring and 
managing the risks throughout the supply chain. Some risks are known and expected but others 
are unknown and often unexpected. This is a critical component of supply chain management, 
because without effective risk management an entire supply chain is susceptible to failure at all 
phases. Proper risk management is also vital for success within the agribusiness industry. One 
improper risk management policy can have long-term effects on a business’ profitability along 
with their reputation. Supply chain risk management encompasses the aspects of effectively 
managing time, costs, information, among other variables that have potential risks associated 
with them. 
According to a study done by Choi et al. (2016), there are 2 major types of risk within a 
supply chain system – operational risk and disruption risk. Operational risks are the uncertainties 
that firms face on a regular working basis. This may include uncertainties in supply, demand, 
market price, and cost. Even without disruptions in normal operations, these business 
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components pose potential uncertainty. Proper operational risk control stems from understanding 
the sources of the risks and knowing the potential variability in them. Optimization models can 
be used to measure and control operational risks. On a farm level, operational risks may come in 
the form of supply uncertainty throughout the growing season, price uncertainty if not properly 
hedged, or crop input price uncertainty.   
The supply chain depicted in this study starts with soybeans at a shuttle facility in 
Jamestown, ND and ends with the soybeans loaded on a vessel in the PNW to be shipped to a 
foreign destination. This is a complex, dynamic supply chain that deals with various modes of 
transportation and exemplifies the importance of timing. Costs components studied in this model 
include: 
• Futures market  
• Basis  
• Shuttle elevator handling 
• Rail tariff 
• Primary rail market (COT)  
• Secondary rail market 
• Export facility handling 
• Vessel demurrage 
• Ocean freight  
Not all listed costs are used in the same specific scenario. Determination of each cost 
component is dependent on the type of contract used and which party is responsible for each 
cost. The cost of the futures market is reflected in the futures price for the appropriate month. 
This cost can be mitigated by the act of hedging in the cash and futures markets. When a market 
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participant is 100% hedged that means they have taken an equal and opposite position in the 
futures market compared to the position they have in the cash market. For example, if an elevator 
was long or owned 1,000,000 bushels of soybeans and wanted to be 100% hedged, they would 
short/sell 200 contracts of soybeans on the futures market. One futures contract is equivalent to 
5,000 bushels which is where the 200 contracts is derived from. This eliminates potential price 
risk in the cash and futures markets. However, it does not eliminate exposure to basis risk. 
Basis is a representation of the difference between cash price futures price. For example, 
if the local cash price for soybeans in Jamestown is $10.50/bushel and the nearby futures price is 
$11.20/bushel then the Jamestown basis would be $-0.70/bushel or commonly referred to as, “70 
under”. This value is a representation many different factors. The difference in these two prices 
is due to 4 main factors: transportation costs, storage costs, supply/demand conditions, and 
premiums/discounts. Transportation costs are dependent upon location of the local elevator and 
distance to the next destination. Storage costs are dependent upon time of year. The other two 
factors are dependent upon economic conditions at that time along with the condition of the 
commodity. Some examples of potential commodity discounts would be damage, test weight, 
foreign materials, etc. 
If a market participant is 100% hedged in the cash and futures markets, they are still 
exposed to basis risk. One way in which this risk can be mitigated is through a basis contract. A 
basis contract locks in the basis value between the two parties in the contract which eliminates 
any fluctuation in the basis and therefore eliminates potential basis risk. The idea is to lock in the 
basis and price the contract at a later time in the future. This contract type may eliminate basis 
risk exposure; however, it exposes the participants to risk in the futures market.  
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Basis values also experience seasonality due to the factors listed previously. The origin 
basis in Jamestown, ND, is typically lowest during the harvest period. This is due to the rapid 
influx/increase in supply relative to demand conditions at that time. As the harvest period ends, 
basis values tend to increase and in the case of soybeans, tend to peak in the December-January 
time frame. This is a critical component to the decision-making process at both the farmer and 
country elevator level. Basis is used to evaluate timing and storage decisions by many 
participants in the agri-supply chain.  
The cost of country handling is simply what the elevator charges to handle the grain. It is 
a representation of the handling margin for the elevator or also a representation of their profit 
margin. This data is hard to track but can be estimated through industry representatives. This is 
an important cost in the agri-supply chain that market participants should be sure to include in 
cost estimation.  
There are 3 important costs involved in the process of moving grain by rail: tariff, 
primary market, and secondary market. A combination of the tariff rate and one of the other costs 
is the main mechanism for which rail shipment is priced. The tariff rate is the base amount that 
the shipper pays for use of the rail. It is set by the rail carrier and covers the cost of rail service, 
margin for the rail carrier, and potentially a fuel service charge (bnsf.com) Of those 3 inputs that 
make up the tariff rate, the fuel service charge is said to fluctuate with the price of fuel. The tariff 
rate may change monthly depending on the variables that make it up. 
The tariff rate only covers the cost of trains to the destination. It does not secure the 
ability to reserve cars. That is done through either the primary or secondary rail market. The 
Certificate of Transportation (COT) program was established by BNSF (BN at the time) in 1988. 
This program had some key features that helped shippers mitigate risk including: forward 
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contracting, auction allocation system, transferability, and guaranteeing placement (Wilson & 
Dahl 2005). Under the auction-based system, participants bid for Certificates of Transport 
(COT). Shippers places bid for cars in an auction setting that happens frequently. This system 
allocates cars with more economic efficiency because the allocation is based on who values them 
the most at the time rather than in the past where it was based on who applied first (Landman). 
The total shipping rate after the COT auction would then be the tariff rate plus the premium, 
which is the winning bid amount from the auction.   
One major component of the COT program is transferability, which is what makes up the 
secondary market. The secondary market allows owners of COTs to sell the cars they don’t need 
to buyers looking to purchase them. For example, if a grain elevator owns a COT and they 
decide that they do not need all the cars for that given month, they then have the ability to utilize 
the secondary rail market and sell the trip they don’t need to another shipper looking to purchase 
it (Landman 2017). Just as the COT is priced, the secondary market price is priced as a premium 
or discount on the tariff rate. Due to intra-season supply and demand levels, there is variability in 
shipping demand. This mechanism provides means for shippers to purchase and sell cars based 
on that demand (Wilson & Dahl 2011 & 2005). By utilizing both the primary and secondary 
markets, shippers can mitigate risk. If only the primary market was available, shippers would be 
taking on a substantial more amount of risk because COTs are forward contracts for a fixed 
period.   
2.5. Supply Chain Disruption Risk     
The second type of risk within is a supply chain system is disruption risk. Supply chain 
disruptions are occurrences within a supply chain that have negative consequences on regular 
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operations. These occurrences cause some degree of disorder within the supply chain which can 
cause minor or detrimental impacts to the entire supply chain (Vakharia and Yenipazarli 2008).   
In relation to agricultural supply chains, disruptions are usually caused by unexpected 
weather events, increase in demand from the same and/or another industry, infrastructural issues 
among other occurrences, most being unexpected. These events caused at one point in the supply 
chain can create a bottleneck, which is a point of congestion within a supply chain. Bottlenecks, 
if severe enough can have detrimental impacts to the whole supply chain network. Some supply 
chain disruptions are minor and aren’t realized throughout the entire supply chain; however, 
other disruptions can cause congestion/delays that become extremely impactful to the entire 
supply chain and the firm(s) operating in it.  
Most agricultural supply chains, whether they be domestic or international have 
chokepoints along them. Chokepoints are crucial points on transport routes through which 
exceptional volumes of trade pass. They can either occur naturally or from manmade 
infrastructure. Most chokepoints fall under one of the following: seaports, maritime straits, road 
and rail networks, or inland waterways. Examples of inland chokepoints in the US are locks and 
dams along the Mississippi River. The US also has coastal chokepoints such as seaports located 
at the PNW and the Gulf of Mexico.  
According to a global study done by Bailey and Wellesley (2017), the United States’ 
inland waterway system is aging, and infrastructural investment will be needed within the near 
future or else congestion issues will arise. According to the study, “Upper Mississippi River and 
Illinois Waterway system is projected to reach 90% of its annual throughput capacity by 2020, 
leading to delays and a significant proportion of traffic shifting to other transport modes”. The 
study also stated that the rail network is due to be constrained within the coming years. They 
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forecasted that 30% of US railway corridors are expected to be above capacity, and a further 
25% near or at full capacity by 2035. Any type of unexpected disruption to the United States 
supply chain network could have extreme impacts on inland and/or coastal chokepoints.  
One way in which congestion can arise within a supply chain is from an increase in 
competition from another industry, particularly competition in transportation. An example of this 
is the recent Baaken oil boom in North Dakota and how that affected the shipping of agricultural 
commodities. Oil companies, during this time were able to consume a majority of railroad 
business due to having more price attractive and stable offerings. According to an article written 
by Williamson (2014) in combination with CoBank, “Rail service deteriorated dramatically 
beginning in late summer/early fall of 2013. Railroad terminal dwell times increased more than 
20 percent due to greater demand, shortages of locomotives and lack of crews.”   
Weather disruptions during the winter months of 2013/14 also added to rail congestion. 
The bitter cold temperatures along with winter storms in the Midwest caused a decrease in train 
speeds along with many delays. A combination of weather disruptions, increase in shipping 
demand along with record harvests in the Upper Midwestern states, made it extremely difficult 
for agribusiness firms to move grain out of the Upper Midwest to the PNW.     
The disruption attributed to the oil boom eventually backed up and/or diverted enough 
service that is was noticed throughout the country. “The huge hub of railroads was so congested 
that railroads began diverting trains to St. Louis and Memphis without shipper input. When these 
terminals exceeded capacity, terminals like Kansas City and Tulsa also became congested to the 
point that BNSF began to ask short-lines and terminal railroads to hold trains until room could be 
made to move them” (Williamson 2014).  
 20 
  
An eventual decline in the price of oil slowed the demand from the Baaken formation, 
which mitigated the congestion issue. Although this isn’t a current problem in the industry, 
merchandisers understand this is a looming issue which could easily arise again in the near 
future.  
Brazil is a country that is currently experiencing a major increase in soybean production. 
The increase in production is stemmed from a major increase in foreign demand. Although 
Brazil has the available land and appropriate weather conditions to sustain a production increase, 
the country’s transportation infrastructure has not been able to keep pace. According an article 
by King (2017), “Due to the poor inland logistics and heavy reliability on trucks, our inland 
logistics are less efficient and far more expensive than those of our main competitors – the U.S. 
and Argentina”. The current infrastructure is being utilized at maximum capacity, which means 
that any type of exogenous delay is critical. In early 2017, heavy rains struck a portion of the 
country and drivers in that area were reporting that it was taking 14 days to cover the 620-mile 
route (King 2017). Because of the congestion, routes were diverted, and transportation costs 
increased significantly.  
Seasonal delays during peak grain exporting times are common in the country. 
Historically, delays in the Port of Paranagua have reached 45 to 60 days (King 2017). Delays like 
this significantly increase transportation costs and make Brazil a much less attractive global 
supplier.    
A substantial investment towards transport infrastructure must be made by Brazil if the 
country wants to realize its full export potential (King 2017). Progress has been made and the 
country is continuing to overcome the logistical problems it has been facing. According to King 
 21 
  
(2017), “Delays at key ports such as Santos and Paranagua at the turn of the year were far lower 
than in previous years. Moreover, Brazil’s ports have been boosting capacity.”  
Brazil isn’t the only country experiencing domestic congestion. Although it may not be as 
severe, The United States is currently facing transport issues that have caused supply chain 
disruptions and will continue to do so into the future. Of the $40 billion in annual grain and 
soybean exports from the US, about 60 percent is transported by barges on rivers (Polansek and 
Plume 2017). One river in which a recent bottleneck arose is the Ohio River. In the early fall of 
2017, a shutdown caused by worn or missing sections of a dam, backed up river traffic and 
created a line 50 miles long of traffic waiting to get through Locks & Dam No. 52. Due to the 
aging infrastructure, the lock has become a major chokepoint along the river.  
Delays such as this not only had an adverse effect on transportation timing but were also 
reflected in prices. Grain prices were bumped at export terminals which benefited international 
competitors such as Brazil (Polansek and Plume 2017). The price movements were realized all 
the way down to the producer level. Because of the delays, many grain handling facilities had no 
other choice but to lower prices and stockpile grain. With margins already extremely tight, an 
unexpected loss due to disruptions in the supply chain is a critical hit to producers and grain 
handlers. Shipping companies were also hurt by the disruptions. “Barge operator Campbell 
Transportation Company of Pittsburgh estimated a loss of $1 million in revenue in September 
and October because of the delays” (Polansek and Plume 2017). 
Because a majority of the country’s locks have exceeded their half century design lives, 
nearly half of the vessels using the nation’s inland waterways are now experiencing delays 
according to the American Society of Civil Engineers. Delay time per lock has nearly doubled on 
 22 
  
waterways since 2000, rising from 64 minutes in 2000 to 121 minutes in 2014 (Polansek and 
Plume 2017).  
According to Polansek and Plume (2017), “An October National Waterways Foundation 
study said a major lock failure in the Midwest could cost shippers $1.5 billion per year in added 
costs and overwhelm existing rail and road capacity.” These inland delays and added costs are 
becoming crucial for the United States. As soybean production continues to grow in competing 
countries such as Brazil, the United States can’t afford to experience added delays and costs if 
the country wants to keep a competitive edge in soybean exports among other commodities.  
Another one of the United States’ major export locations, the PNW, experienced critical 
supply chain disruptions in the spring of 2017. A majority of the grain that isn’t exported from 
through the Gulf of Mexico is sent through the PNW. Severe weather in the spring of 2017 along 
transportation routes to the PNW caused significant delays which had adverse effects on market 
participants trying to export grain. 
Extensive rainfall caused washouts and landslides which prevented shuttle trains from 
reaching the PNW in normal time. Blizzards along transportation routes to the PNW also caused 
major delays. The heavy rainfall at the port locations stopped the loading of vessels, which 
created another source of congestion at the port. One report indicated that in February, there 
were about 60 ships in port or waiting offshore. The monthly loading capacity in that area in the 
PNW is only 40 ships. This was expected to cause delays of up to 20 days (Thomson Reuters 
2017).   
Due to the disruptions, the cost of freight increased quickly. Reported in February 2017 
by Thomson Reuters, “The average rate in the secondary market for spot BNSF shuttle railcars 
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has hit $2,000 above tariff rate per car, up from $1,267 above tariff a month ago. A year ago, it 
was $108 below tariff, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture data”.        
The major delay times at the PNW caused many foreign customers to choose alternative 
routes, such as the Gulf Coast terminals to transport the grain they were purchasing. Even though 
shipping times from the Gulf can be up to two weeks longer, many Asian customers felt it was 
beneficial to utilize that route instead of paying the demurrage penalties, waiting, and shipping 
through the PNW. Many Asian buyers scrambled for fill-in supplies from China while Japan 
tapped its emergency grain stockpile (Thomson Reuters 2017).  
China, one of the major soybean importers also experienced significant congestion issues 
in the fall of 2017. Shipping data from Thomson Reuters Eikon showed 17 dry-bulk carriers, 
most holding soybeans, anchored off Rizhao port waiting due to congestion. Port congestion 
along with negative crushing margins caused China to resell more than 500,000 tonnes of 
soybeans (Thomson Reuters 2017). 
2.6. Supply Chain Congestion Modeling Techniques 
A powerful modeling technique for measuring and managing congestion is the use of 
queuing theory. A queuing system is one in which customers receive some kind of service from a 
server and if that service is not available, they wait for it. This then forms a waiting line which is 
better known as a queue. Queuing models can then be developed for particular industries and 
supply chains. Customer waiting time, queue length, and server idle time are among a few of the 
evaluation criteria developed from the use of queuing models (Aziziankohan et al. 2017).  
Leachman and Jula (2011) performed a study on congestion analysis regarding 
containerized imports to the United States from Asia. They developed a queuing model to 
estimate container flow times through port terminals. The estimation of container flow times 
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through ports was derived as a function of volume, infrastructure, staffing levels and operating 
schedules. The model developed was able to be industry applicable and also easily integrated 
with other queuing models that incorporated various parts of the supply chain. Many other 
studies have proven that queuing models are an effective tool for congestion measurement and 
mitigation (Aziziankohan et al. 2017, van Woensel and Cruz 2009, Heidemann 1994, van 
Woensel and Vandaele 2006, Garrido and Allendes 2002).  
Although queuing theory is a powerful tool for congestion modeling, there are many 
other techniques that have been used to model congestion. Jones, et al. (1995) created a spatial 
price equilibrium model to study wheat export shipments through the PNW. They created 
hypothetical supply chain disruptions and analyzed the changes in commodity flows. Bai, et al. 
(2011) used linear programming and produced a heuristic algorithm to show the effects of 
congestion on biofuel refinery location design and total system costs.  
Jones, et al. (2011) developed a System for Import/Export Routing and Recovery 
Analysis to predict flows between foreign countries and North American ports. Fan, Wilson, and 
Dahl (2015) developed a stochastic network-flow model to analyze risk potential of container 
imports into the United States.  
Given the supply chain used in this study, disruptions and congestion are most likely to 
occur along the rail line or at the port. Previous industry examples have exemplified the 
possibilities of these disruptions occurring and the effects it has on the entire supply chain.  
2.7. Summary 
  This chapter provides an overview of supply chain management in agriculture along 
with its importance and potential risk for participating firms. A supply chain relative to this study 
is depicted along with another supply chain compiled by CHS to represent the flow of 
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commodities throughout an international supply chain. Supply chain variables are depicted and 
described at each stage. The associated risk of each supply chain cost is also mentioned. Certain 
costs allow for risk mitigation by hedging, choosing various contracting types, along with 
logistical price coverage. Other supply chain risks are more difficult to account for, including 
demurrage. Supply chain disruption risk and its importance in supply chain management is 
examined in this chapter. Lastly, various industry examples of supply chain congestion and 
demurrage penalties are highlighted to show the impact of disruption risk in a real-life setting.   
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CHAPTER 3. COMPETITIVE BIDDING: BACKGROUND AND PRIOR STUDIES 
3.1. Introduction 
The competitive bidding process is used actively in the agribusiness industry as a form of 
conducting business. More specifically, it is used in the form of international tenders where 
governments, private firms or other institutions will invite bids from competitors all across the 
globe in order to supply a certain volume of a requested commodity to them. Potential suppliers 
will submit bids based on their cost structure among other variables in hopes to win the tender. 
The winner of the tender will then supply the buyer with the commodity.   
This chapter examines the seminal studies of competitive bidding along with other 
relevant literature to the topic. The competitive bidding process is explained in detail. An 
application of competitive bidding to agriculture is introduced by analyzing an industry example. 
Lastly, auction types are differentiated along with winning bid selection variations.   
3.2. Competitive Bidding Modeling Techniques 
There are 3 main model types that seem to be prominent in competitive bidding research. 
They are simulation-based models, deterministic models, and game theory decision-based 
models. The model used in this study is a simulation-based model using Monte Carlo simulation 
to derive optimal bids.   
Deterministic models are based on mathematical equations to represent relationships 
among variables and don’t include any randomness at all. This means that for a given set of input 
values, deterministic models will always generate the exact same output. Simulation-based 
models are used to predict outcomes when there is randomness and unknown variables in the 
model. This modeling technique is designed to account for risk and uncertainty in model 
building process. Rather than just replacing an unknown variable with an average number, 
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Monte Carlo Simulation replaces unknown variables with probability distributions. This 
accounts for randomness and potential risks in the model. After probability distributions are 
created to fit the data, the model is then simulated over and over using different values from the 
distributions to derive results. The number of iterations or times the model is ran depends on how 
complex the model is and how much uncertainty is included in the model. A distribution of 
potential outcomes is generated to obtain final results. The Monte Carlo Simulation technique 
allows users to fit the data to many different types of probability distributions. Instead of just 
assuming a normal or “bell curve” distribution, data can be fit to other types of distributions 
which may represent it better. 
Simulation-based models not only generate outcomes, but also determine how probable 
those outcomes are. Monte Carlo Simulation also allows users to perform sensitivity analysis on 
the results. When using deterministic models, it is hard to know which input variables impact the 
output the most. Monte Carlo Simulation is able to represent how much each input variable 
impacts the output value(s).      
More specific to competitive bidding, game theory decision-making models are often 
utilized. Game theory models organize a competitive bidding environment as a game with 
various objectives, inputs, and outputs. Depending on the objective of the study, many different 
techniques and strategies are used for decision-making. These types of studies take a slightly 
different approach to model building compared to most deterministic and simulation-based 
models.  
3.3. Prior Studies  
Lawrence Friedman (1956) paved the way with the first major study regarding 
competitive bidding. Other studies such as Gates (1967), and Carr (1982) based their ideas from 
 28 
  
Friedman and made valuable contributions to the literature. This study will follow a baseline idea 
of Friedman’s model with appropriate deviations to reach the objectives.   
The objective of Friedman’s study was for a potential bidder to maximize profit by 
submitting a bid at an optimal level. He analyzed previous bidding behavior of competitors to 
derive a bid function for each competitor and predict future bidding behavior from that function. 
In order to derive an optimal bid for a competitor, Friedman used a profit function multiplied by 
what he termed as the ‘probability of winning’ [p(x)]. The function is as follows: 
E(x) = (X – C) ۰ P(x) 
Where E(x) is the expected profit, P(x) is the probability of underbidding all competitors 
and winning the auction, X is the bid amount submitted, and C is the estimated cost. The 
probability of wining was derived through a ratio of previous bidding behavior to own cost for 
each competitor. This creates an underlying distribution for each competitor in which a 
probability of winning can be drawn from. The product of the individual probabilities for each 
competitor would result in the probability of winning the tender. As expected, results indicated 
that a higher bid would result in greater profit but would also decrease p(w); whereas, a lower 
bid wouldn’t be as profitable but would have a higher p(w). One advantage of using Friedman’s 
model is that it is relatively simple and easy to comprehend. Industry participants are able to 
easily utilize his model for bid prediction if they have the required previous bidding data.  
Gates (1967), used an approach similar to that of Friedman, except the representation of 
the probability of winning was done differently in his model. Gates uses the same bid/cost ratio 
as Friedman to derive the probability of winning against a potential competitor; however, the 
studies differ when these probabilities are combined to represent the probability of winning the 
entire tender against multiple competitors (Crowley 2000). Instead of simply multiplying the 
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individual probabilities to obtain the probability of winning the tender, Gates suggests this 
formula is the appropriate way to determine the probability of winning:  
Pwinning = 1/[1-PA)/PA + (1-PB)/PB + (1-PC)/PC + … + (1-PN)/PN +1] 
Where a trial bid is used and the probabilities of competitor A, B, C, … , N placing a bid 
higher than the trial bid is given by PA, PB, PC, … , PN, respectively (Crowley 2000). In this 
scenario, Friedman’s model would suggest,  
Pwinning = PA X PB X PC X …X PN. 
It is evident that Friedman’s model takes into consideration the area of the distribution 
where competitors are placing a bid higher than that of the trial bid; whereas, Gates considers the 
opposite. As a result, Gates’ model tends to choose optimal bids higher than that of Friedman’s 
model when they are compared in an identical situation. It can be concluded that Gates’ model 
would generate a higher profit but have less of a probability of winning the tender and the 
opposite can be said about Friedman’s model (Hosny and Elhakeem 2012). One disadvantage of 
Friedman’s model is that it suggests the variability of competitor bids to be based strictly from 
historical data, instead of focusing on a present reality for the cost estimate (Crowley 2000).    
This difference set the stage for an abundance of research done on the comparison of the 
two models (Benjamin 1972, Curtis and Maines 1973, Griffis 1992, Skitmore et al. 2007). Many 
authors have taken various comparison approaches to compare the two models and conclude 
which of the two they prefer. Research on this controversy is still being done today. 
With the seminal work of Friedman and Gates, Carr (1982), was able to produce a more 
articulate model that focuses on cost estimation and the markup value error associated with that. 
Carr’s model is not restricted by the same assumptions in which Friedman’s and Gates’ are. His 
objective was to produce a general bidding model that can be applied to any competition in 
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which a bidder’s cost distribution and potential opponents’ bid distributions can be estimated 
(Carr 1982). 
When Friedman estimated his model, he only took into consideration the estimated cost 
which makes sense because true cost is unknown at the time of bid placement. However, 
Friedman failed to address the fact that the optimal bid price is directly affected by the 
inaccuracies in cost estimation (Takano, Ishii, Muraki 2014). This is crucial because an 
inaccurate cost estimation could end up in extreme loss for a tender participant.   
 Carr concludes that Friedman’s model is beneficial and accurate when costs are constant, 
and bids only vary in markup value. However, he argues that this is not the case in most 
situations, and relative costs are random variables and have direct impact on the markup value 
associated with the bid.  
As Friedman, Gates and Carr conclude, participants in the competitive bidding process 
are faced with many uncertainties. They are uncertain of their own costs, competitor costs, 
number of potential competitors, among other firm specific uncertainties. All of these 
uncertainties pose substantial risk to potential bidders and they must include these risks when 
determining their optimal bid. Many other studies have been performed aiming to evaluate 
bidder uncertainty (Naert and Weverbergh 1978, King and Mercer 1990, Capen et al. 1971, Carr 
1983, Chapman, Ward and Bennell 2000, Skitmore 2002, Skitmore 2004, Hosny and Elhakeem 
2012.)     
A recent study done by Ribeiro et. al (2017) uses a real options approach to maximize the 
optimal bid. It is assumed that each bidder has the flexibility of whether or not to accept the 
contract if they win the tender. Due to that assumption, the model also accommodates for the 
inclusion of penalty costs if a tender winner refuses to enter into the contract. The model is based 
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on the valuation of a specific real option that can only be exercised by the winner of the tender. 
Two different components are integrated into the maximization problem: 
1. The value of the option to sign the contract 
2. The probability of wining the bid  
The authors concluded that maximizing the value of the option of whether or not to sign 
the contract, weighted by the probability of winning was an effective approach to determining 
the optimal bid. They also concluded that the optimal price is higher when penalty costs are 
included in the model. This is because potential bidders/managers will need to present a higher 
bid to account for such a cost (Ribeiro et. al 2017). The model is also based on market and firm-
specific information which also makes is an applicable tool for decision makers in the 
construction contracting industry. Although this study isn’t applicable to the agribusiness 
industry, it is important to note that it is often valuable to create a model that can easily be 
applied and utilized by managers in a certain industry. This thesis aims to do just that. 
Another way to approach the modeling of competitive bidding is by using a type of 
criteria evaluation method. Cagno, Caron and Perego (2001) used a simulation approach based 
on the Analytic Hierarchy Process. They were able to derive the probability of winning by 
evaluating competing bids on a multiple criteria basis. Lai, Liu and Wang (2002) performed a 
similar study in which they determined the preferred markup level for a bidder by evaluating 
specific criteria. Many other studies analyzing competitive bidding based on a type of criteria 
evaluation method have been performed (Dozzi, AbouRizk and Schroeder 1996, Watt, Kayis and 
Willey 2009, Shafahi and Haghani 2014).       
Takano, Ishii and Muraki (2014), recently performed a study on competitive bidding by 
developing a stochastic dynamic programming model. The in-depth focus of their study was on 
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the effects of inaccurate costs estimates on sequential competitive bidding. The interesting take-
away from their study that will be used in this study is the value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. VaR is 
a financial risk measure that is used to quantify the level of financial risk within a firm, or 
potential tender bid in this case. This purpose of executing this constraint is to protect the firm 
from the possibility of realizing a large loss due to uncertainty in potential costs. In previous 
literature, most focus has been on profit maximization and very little work has been done on the 
focus of risk mitigation from inaccurate cost estimates (Takano, Ishii and Muraki 2014). The 
inclusion of the VaR measure will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4.    
   The study utilized numerical simulations between two different model setups in order 
to realize the impact of the VaR constraint. One model accounted for cost uncertainty and the 
other did not. They concluded that the VaR constraint was not significant in the model that 
accounted for cost uncertainty through expected profit. However, the VaR constraint proved to 
be significant for the model that did not account for cost uncertainty. Imposing the VaR 
constraint in the model that did not account for cost uncertainty increased profits to a similar 
level of the model that included uncertainty about the costs (Takano, Ishii and Muraki 2014). 
This proves that the VaR constrain was indeed significant.     
3.4. Competitive Bidding in Agriculture 
There has not been an abundance of research performed when combining agriculture and 
competitive bidding. Just because there have not been many relevant studies applying the tender 
process to agribusiness, doesn’t mean competitive bidding isn’t relevant in the world of 
agriculture. Tenders are common in the form of commodity procurement across the world. They 
are also common for procurement purposes in the livestock industry. 
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A study done by Crespi and Sexton (2004) analyzed the bidding behavior of beef-
processing plants bidding for cattle in the Texas Panhandle. This study had the conceptual idea 
of modeling bidding behavior of competitors to form a derivation of an optimal bid scenario for a 
beef-processing plant in the procurement process. The auction type utilized for cattle 
procurement was the same as the one used in this study, first-price sealed-bid auctions. Bid 
functions for each processing plant were derived using regression. Free on Board (FOB) feedlot 
prices for spot market purchases were regressed on variables such as whole sale boxed-beef 
price, live cattle futures price, yield, distance, and others. 
Simulations were then conducted in replication of the actual auctions held and results 
were compared to the real-life situations. It was concluded that in relation to the simulated 
auctions, cattle in the region studied sold for a lower price, were sometimes acquired by a plant 
that didn’t have the highest willingness-to-pay and were consistently purchased by the same 
plant (Crespi and Sexton 2004). Factors such as inconsistent bidding, low number of bidders, and 
business loyalty were concluded to be a few of many reasons contributing to that. Although this 
study follows the same conceptual framework of replicating bidding behavior in a tender setting, 
it relies heavily on past bidding behavior and lacks focus on the cost structure of the firms 
participating in the tenders.  
Wilson and Dahl (2001) studied competitive bidding in the case of minor oilseeds. This 
was an analytical study in which the authors formed bid functions for suppliers in the tenders 
based on previous bidding data. Bid functions were formed using regression. Previous bids were 
regressed on a cost indicator value relative to the commodity at hand. From that data, optimal 
bids were derived using a profit function along with derivation of the probability of winning the 
tender.  
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Results indicated that there is significance in optimal bid derivation and the number of 
bidders. An increase in the number of bidders, decreases the optimal bid. The frequency of 
random bidders also proved to have an impact on the optimal bid. Lastly, information available 
among rivals proved to be of significance in optimal bid derivation. These are 3 critical variables 
that have a direct impact on optimal bid derivation and should be taken into consideration when 
the appropriate data is available.  
A similar study performed by Wilson and Diersen (1999) analyzed the bidding strategies 
for suppliers participating in international wheat import tenders. A stochastic simulation model 
was used to derive optimal bids and bidding strategies for competitors. This study also utilized 
simulations to perform sensitivity analysis on critical variables in relation to deriving the optimal 
bid. One variable in particular was cost differentials. It was concluded that firms with lower costs 
would have lower optimal bids and high-cost firms would have higher optimal bids. As the 
number of bidders increases, this becomes more advantageous for low-cost firms relative to 
high-cost firms because the optimal bid decreases. 
Another important concept highlighted in this study was that of the winner’s curse. This 
concept is used to describe outcomes of competitive bidding situations where the winner of the 
tender ends up with extremely low or even negative profits (Wilson and Dierson 2001). Each 
participant in the tender submits bids based on expected costs and some markup value over those 
costs. The winner of the tender may have won because their cost estimate was lower than that of 
their competitor’s. Because these costs are unknown in their entirety, bidders may often 
underestimate true costs when deriving their bid. Intense bidding competition can create an 
environment in which profit margins are extremely tight to begin with and underestimation of 
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true costs can result in negative profits for the winner. In that case, the winner’s cost estimate is 
biased relative to true cost, and he/she is said to be “cursed” with negative profits (Thaler 1992).  
 The winner’s curse was first studied by Capen, Capp, and Campbell (1971). These three 
petroleum engineers analyzed oil lease auctions and, more specifically, why the winners of these 
auctions were constantly suffering from extremely low or negative profits. They concluded that 
the auction winners were the bidders who overestimated the value of the land being auctioned for 
oil drilling rights, and, therefore, were “cursed” with extremely low or negative profits.  
A book written by Thaler (1992), highlights studies of the winner’s curse in many 
different auction environments including company acquisition, construction project tenders, 
book publishing, and free agent markets in baseball. This goes to show that the winner’s curse is 
relevant in many different auction settings.     
3.5. The Competitive Bidding Process 
The competitive bidding process in the international grain trade industry is done in the 
form of a first-price sealed-bid tender. A majority of international import tenders are set up in 
terms of a country’s government looking to purchase a certain amount of a certain commodity. 
The buyer submits a notice detailing the criteria of the tender such as commodity, amount to be 
bought, and a deadline for bid submission. After the notice has been issued, any firm in the world 
is able to submit one or more sealed bids. There may be certain stipulations on maximum bids 
that can be submitted, but that is unique to each tender. Each potential bidder/supplier is faced 
with many unknowns such as, which firms will be submitting bids, how many firms will be 
submitting bids, cost structure of competing firms, and even their own cost structure. This makes 
the process of deriving an accurate optimal bid extremely complex and faces the bidder with 
potential risks.  
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When the time allotted for bid submission has expired, the firm(s) with the lowest bids 
submitted will win the tender and then be required to supply the buyer with the commodity 
requested. There may be more than one firm chosen to supply the buyer with the commodity, 
depending on the amount of the commodity the buyer is looking to purchase. Often times, the 
two or three lowest bidders are chosen to supply the buyer with the commodity.  
3.6. Industry Example 
A major user of the international import tendering process is the General Authority for 
Supply Commodities (GASC) of Egypt. The GASC is an economic entity formed for the purpose 
of procuring commodities within the framework of a strategic plan. The entity also works to raise 
agricultural production efficiency, create competitiveness, strives for structural sustainability and 
balance in state and local markets, among other targets (www.gasc.gov.eg)  
Egypt is the biggest importer of wheat in the world and a major procurement strategy for 
the country is utilizing the tendering process. The GASC issues frequent notices for tenders 
seeking wheat of various varieties and in various volumes. The economic entity has a set of 
requirements that competing firms must abide by when submitting bids and following through 
with the tendering process and supplying of the commodity. The requirement set was revised by 
the GASC in February of 2018.  
Some of the changes in the requirements were in benefit of the importing country and 
others were to supplement the supplier in regards to demurrage fees. The GASC lowered the 
protein requirements for wheats such as Russian, Romanian, Ukrainian, French, U.S. soft, and 
U.S. hard red wheats. This was done in hopes to increase bidder competition and moderate price 
increases. If the protein requirement is lowered, more suppliers may be willing to participate in 
the tenders and the current participants may be able to supply wheat at a lower price which 
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would create more competition and drive down the bidding price in benefit of Egypt, the 
importing country.  
The GASC also made a change to the demurrage policy in response to supplier 
complaints and a decrease in tender participation. A change in the inspection process increased 
the vessel unloading time substantially, which in turn increased delays for unloading and the 
added costs were put on the supplier. In response, many suppliers quit participating in the tenders 
or increased their bid amount to account for potential demurrage, which faced suppliers with 
extreme exposure to risk and uncertainty. A tender was nearly halted in the spring of 2018 due to 
a standoff over demurrage payments which led suppliers to withhold their offers (af.reuters.com) 
In response to that, GASC set a cap on demurrage fees. They now only require the supplier to 
pay the first 12 days of demurrage at $12,000 per day. After that time, the supplier won’t be 
responsible for the demurrage payment. Prior to this policy, the supplier was responsible for all 
demurrage fees no matter how long the delay. This made it extremely difficult for suppliers to 
determine their cost structure and also exposed them to substantial risk. The new fixed-rate 
system helps with cost calculation and also reduces risk exposure for the suppliers 
(af.reuters.com). Although these policy changes are unique to the GASC and their wheat 
importing process, they provide a good example of the process and guidelines that suppliers must 
follow when participating in international grain tenders. 
3.7. Auction Types 
There are 4 common types of auctions used everyday business: English auctions, Dutch 
auction, first-price sealed bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions. Other auction types 
are certainly utilized, but these 4 seem to be the most prevalently utilized in business 
transactions.  
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An English auction is an ascending auction where the auctioneer picks a starting price for 
the item being auctioned and increases that price until only one bidder remains. That bidder then 
wins the item. A Dutch auction is a descending auction where the auctioneer initially starts the 
bidding process at a very high price and decreases that price until a bidder stops the auction and 
claims the item at the current price offered by the auctioneer. A first-price sealed bid auction is a 
much more private type of auction in which bidders submit sealed bids and the highest bid wins 
the auction. A second-price sealed-bid auction is the same as a first-price sealed-bid auction, 
except the second highest price is paid by the winner. The bidder with the highest bid still wins 
the auction, except they pay the price equivalent to the second highest bid. This type of auction is 
also known as a Vickery auction. The reason it is done this way is because it give an incentive 
for participants to submit realistic, competitive bids. First-price sealed-bid and second-price 
sealed-bid auctions can be used in both a buy or sell setting.   
 In both the English and Dutch auctions, bidders are aware of how many competing 
bidders they have. However, in first-price sealed-bid and second-price sealed-bid auctions, 
bidders are often unaware of how many competitors they have. This is a critical component in 
bid derivation for those submitting bids.  
This study focuses on the use of the first-price sealed-bid tender process. A tender is 
another way of referring to an auction setting, in which offers or bids are accepted for a contract, 
project, or task assigned by the initiator of the tender. The process of competitive bidding works 
in the way of a reverse auction, where firms submit bids and the lowest bid will win. The 
initiator of the tender is looking to procure a commodity, which means the bidders also act as 
suppliers to that firm.                  
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3.8. Winning Bid Selection 
Based on the different auction types, there are also different methods in which the 
winning bid is determined. The main methods include low bid, average bid, and next best bid. 
The low bid method is the most common. It is simply, the acceptance of the lowest bid in the 
competitive bidding process. This method is as close of an example as pure competition as 
possible. This method forces bidders/suppliers to continuously try and lower costs to remain as 
competitive as possible. These savings are then passed to the buyer/issuer of the tender through 
the competitive bidding process (Ionnau and Leu 1993).  
 The next best bid method is slightly different. In this case, the bidder who submits the 
lowest bid will still win the tender but will pay the price of the second lowest bid. It is important 
to remember that this is in the context of a reverse auction setting, so the opposite would occur in 
a normal auction setting. The next best bid method is utilized when a second-price sealed bid 
auction is performed.  
Lastly, when an average bid method is exercised, the winner of the tender is the bidder 
who submits a bid closets to the average of all the bids submitted. The reason this method may 
be used is to avoid the possibility of issuing a contract to a bidder who submits an unrealistically 
low bid. When an unrealistically low bid is submitted, many problems can occur for both the 
bidder and the buyer. Such problems include excessive claims and disputes, schedule delays, 
reduction in project quality, increased costs, and others (Ionnau and Leu 1993).    
A study done by Ioannou and Leu (1993) analyzed the difference between the low and 
average bid methods and the effects that these methods can have on bid submission in the 
competitive bidding process. They used applications of both an analytic and a Monte Carlo 
simulation model to perform their study. This study was done in application to the construction 
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industry, so their implications reflect that. The authors concluded that a departure from the low 
bid method has the potential to improve longevity of construction firms and also improve the 
relationships between the owner and contractor. More obvious, the average bid method also has 
the ability to eliminate the accidental and deliberate unrealistically low bids (Ioannou and Leu 
1993). Although the average bid method seems attractive, the main argument against it is that it 
does not promote price competition between competing firms. It is shown in the study that a cost 
savings breakthrough is not realized as much in the average bid method compared to the low bid 
method, unless the breakthrough is realized by all competitors.  
There is not an abundance of supporting literature on the average bid vs. low bid method 
in relation to the agribusiness industry. That could be because the competitive bidding process 
isn’t quite as popular and is slightly more private than competitive bidding in the construction 
industry. Most previous literature in relation to model building in competitive bidding is written 
for use of the low bid method. Also, the tender process in the agribusiness industry seems to use 
this method. For those reasons, the low big method will be used in this study.   
3.9. Summary 
This chapter focuses on competitive bidding by examining the seminal studies, 
development of literature and its relation to competitive bidding in agriculture. Friedman and 
Gates set the ground work for competitive bidding. Most literature builds off of the foundation of 
their work and adapts to various objectives. A study performed by Takano, Ishii, and Muraki 
(2014), includes a VaR analysis to measure risk exposure in competitive bidding. Most previous 
literature focuses primarily on profit maximization and ignores potential risks and uncertainty. 
Firms participating in competitive bidding are exposed to substantial risk and its measurement 
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and management are crucial when participating in competitive bidding. Therefore, a VaR 
analysis is implemented in this study as an alternative specification to the model.  
The competitive bidding process is explained in detail in this chapter. An industry 
example of the Egyptian wheat import tender process is also highlighted to show the process in a 
real-life situation. Lastly, various auction types are explored along with winning bid selection 
types.  
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
4.1. Introduction 
This model is specified to represent a competitive bidding scenario of an international 
import tender for soybeans. More specifically, it is built to derive an optimal bid for a 
prospective bidder considering participating in the tender. A base case scenario is developed for 
a prospective bidder. Sensitivity analysis on strategic variables are then performed to show the 
impact of important variables on the optimal bid. Lastly, an alternative specification is 
exemplified using VaR analysis.   
 The supply chain used in the model represents an origin of Jamestown, North Dakota 
and end destination of either an export facility in the PNW or the importing country. Soybeans 
have grown to be one of the biggest crops in North Dakota outpacing corn and wheat in terms of 
harvested acres. A majority of the beans grown in North Dakota are exported out of the state and 
even the country. The most prominent pipeline for export from North Dakota is by rail to the 
PNW and off to China, which is the biggest importing country of United States soybeans. 
 The final destination and risk parameters for the bidder will vary based on the incoterms 
of the tender. The incoterms of a contract are essentially a set of rules that determine the 
conditions for the buyer and seller. This would include at what point the buyer has responsibility 
of obligations, costs and risk and at what point the seller gains responsibility of obligations, costs 
and risk. They are published by the International Chamber of Commerce and are popularly used 
around the globe for business transactions. The 3 incoterms used in this model are: 
1. Buy at origin & sell Free On Board (FOB) ship  
2. Buy delivered & sell FOB ship 
3. Buy at origin & sell Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) China 
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The first incoterm combination would mean that the bidder assumes responsibility of the 
soybeans at their origin (ND) and the selling/bidding price would be FOB ship. This would mean 
that the buyer of the soybeans would gain responsibility when the beans are loaded on the vessel 
for export.  
The second combination is similar to the first except instead of the bidder buying the 
beans at the origin, they are buying them delivered to the port. This means that they don’t aren’t 
responsible for the transportation costs from ND to the PNW. Instead, they buy the beans already 
delivered and sell them FOB ship. Lastly, the third incoterm combination assumes obligations, 
costs, and risks on behalf of the bidder at all points of the supply chain. The prospective bidder 
purchases the beans at origin (ND) and the bidding/selling price includes the cost of ocean 
freight to the importing country. The importer would then gain responsibility when the vessel 
arrives to the importing country.  
The incoterms of a contract become extremely important when demurrage occurs in the 
supply chain. Supply chain congestion can cause delays which eventually have a ripple effect 
throughout the entire supply chain and additional costs are often incurred because of it. For 
example, if there is congestion on the rail line from ND to the PNW, the exporting vessel may 
arrive before the soybeans do and then demurrage costs will be incurred. The decision of who 
pays those costs are included in the incoterms of the contract. An example of this is presented in 
chapter 5.    
This chapter explains the empirical model in detail. Setup of the model is described along 
with implementation of any additional analysis to that of the base case. The additional 
implementations include a cost measurement of demurrage and an alternative specification of 
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VaR analysis. Lastly, the data used for the model is described in detail including the distributions 
created to represent each cost along with the correlations of costs.  
4.2. Base Case 
A base case scenario is set up to represent the most typical situation in the competitive 
bidding process. It is derived from the standpoint of a prospective bidder looking to participate in 
the tender. A fixed/forward contract is used along with the incoterms of buying the soybeans at 
the origin and selling/bidding them FOB ship. It is assumed that there are 4 competitors/rival 
bidders participating in the tender to make a total of 5 bidders. These bidders are said to be 
symmetric bidders, which means they all have the exact same obligations, cost structure and risk 
potential. 
 It is evident that each bidder won’t bid at or below the derived cost due to the fact that 
there would be zero profit margin for the tender and no incentive for them to submit a bid. To 
best represent a real-life competitive bidding scenario, a distribution was created to derive a bid 
value above cost for each competitor. A normal distribution was used with a mean of 2% over 
cost and standard deviation of 5 cents/bu. Because international soybean import tenders are so 
privatized, it is difficult to gather any type of data to represent the behavior of competitor 
bidding. Therefore, a distribution was created to best represent bidding competitiveness in 
relation to a real-life competitive bidding scenario.  
Models created in previous studies with no observed data use a similar procedure. A 
study performed by Takano et al. (2018), assumes a uniformly distributed estimation error for 
rival bids. The study also mentions that other previous literature assumes competitor estimation 
errors follow a Weibull or log-normal distribution. A study done by Shafahi and Haghani (2014), 
notes that if no historical rival bidding data is available, it is rational to assume that rivals will 
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bid the same as an average bidder in that industry. They assume markup distributions follow a 
normal distribution with a variance derived from the industry in their study.  
Costs are split up between known and unknown costs to form a combination of total costs 
represented for bid submission. In the base case, it is assumed that each rival along with the 
prospective bidder are 100% hedged in nearby soybean futures and their execution of the hedge 
is symmetrical as well. This means that there is no randomness in the cost of nearby futures and 
the value is symmetrical between all bidders. Another known cost that is assumed to be 
symmetrical between all bidders is that of the secondary rail market. Each participant is assumed 
to have participated in the secondary rail market opposed to the primary rail market and have 
covered their position to leave no risk exposure. The last two known costs used in the base case 
are the costs of margin at the origin and PNW. These are 10 cents/bushel and 3 cents/bushel, 
respectively. The unknown costs exemplified in the base case are origin basis, PNW basis, and 
the tariff value. The appropriate distributions along with correlations are used to represent each 
of these costs.  
A simulation table of various bid values is used to show the expected profit at each bid 
and generate the optimal bid. For graphical representation, the first 10 values in the simulation 
table are set in 20 cent increments. The second set of values are set in 10 cent increments and the 
last set are 1 cent increments.     
The third component in the profit function is the probability of winning. This is the 
percentage value that represents prospective bidder’s probability of underbidding each rival, 
individually. An If Function is created to represent this probability and Monte Carlo Simulation 
is used at each bid level to determine that percentage. The function was set up so that if the 
rival’s bid was greater than that of the prospective bidder, a value of 1 was returned. If the rival’s 
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bid was less than that of the prospective bidder, a value of 0 was returned. The mean value of the 
If Function is then recorded, and that value represents the probability of underbidding each 
respective rival.  
For example, in a particular iteration of the model, if the prospective bidder’s bid was 
lower than that of rival A’s bid, then the potential bidder underbid rival A and “won” in that 
scenario. However, just because the potential bidder underbid rival A, doesn’t necessarily mean 
he/she won the tender. In order to derive the probability of winning the tender, the probabilities 
of beating each rival are multiplied together to come up with one probability of winning the 
entire tender at that particular bid level. This derivation technique comes from Friedman’s 
competitive bidding model.  
The combination of the profit function (bid – cost) and probability of wining at a 
particular bid level results in the expected profit at that bid level. The bid with the highest 
expected profit is what determines the optimal bid for the tender. A total of 30 simulations are 
ran with 5,000 iterations each. This means that for each bid level, @Risk is running 5,000 
iterations are completed to come up with an optimal bid, expected profit, and probability of 
winning the tender. 
4.3. Cost of Demurrage 
A measurement of demurrage is also derived in the model and is categorized as an 
unknown cost. It is not included in the base case, but its impact is exemplified in the sensitivity 
analysis on strategic variables. The cost of congestion in its entirety is extremely hard to measure 
and predict but can be a significant cost in competitive bidding.  
As mentioned in chapter 2, queuing theory is one way in which congestion can be 
measured as a cost. Due to the lack of data and information, queuing theory was not able to be 
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implemented in this model. However, the cost of congestion could not be ignored due to its 
significance on optimal bid derivation. To implement this impact, a cost termed ‘demurrage 
measurement’ is incorporated into the model. This cost consists of a probability, cost 
measurement, and representation of time the costs are incurred to formulate a final cost. Table 
4.1 shows the appropriate variables and functions used to derive this cost.  
Table 4.1. Demurrage Measurement 
Variable Function 
Probability of Occurrence =RiskBernoulli(X%) 
Cost Measurement =RiskUniform(18,000;25,000) 
Days Late =RiskUniform(1,8) 
Cost of Congestion =Probability*Cost*DaysLate 
   
The RiskBernoulli function was chosen because this is the best way to represent a 
discrete event with a given probability. Either congestion happens, or it does not with a given 
probability of occurrence (50% and 90% are the probabilities used in this study). A RiskUniform 
distribution is used to actually measure the demurrage cost. The numbers used in the distribution 
($18,000 and $25,000) are estimates from grain traders that participate in international trade and 
are aware of vessel demurrage penalties. To represent the days in which demurrage is incurred, a 
RiskUniform distribution is used starting at 1 day and ending at 8 days. Lastly, the cost of 
congestion is simply the product of the 3 variables. This number is then converted to $/bushel to 
be synonymous with the other cost measurements in the model.  
4.4. Alternative Specification 
Value at Risk (VaR) analysis is used to create an alternative specification in the optimal 
bidding model which assists with risk quantification and risk management practices. VaR is a 
powerful tool that has only recently been introduced to competitive bidding literature. Takano, 
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Ishii and Muraki (2014), introduced VaR into their competitive bidding model. A majority of 
previous competitive bidding literature focused primarily on profit maximization in combination 
with optimal bid derivation. Risk exposure due to uncertainty was neglected, which creates an 
environment for profit loss exposure for bidders. Takano, Ishii and Muraki implemented a VaR 
constraint to nominally measure risk exposure and minimize potential loss while still defining an 
optimal bidding strategy. This measurement can be particularly useful in the competitive bidding 
process if a firm is looking to only expose themselves to a certain risk level.  
Instead of using a simulation table of potential bid values in @Risk, another feature 
called RISKOptimizer is used to determine the VaR measurement. The RISKOptimizer model is 
setup to optimize the expected profit of the tender by adjusting the bid level. A range of various 
bid levels is used in the adjustable cell range to test the expected profit at each of those levels. 
The VaR measurement is implemented through a hard constraint on the optimization. This 
constraint is setup in the format of a percentile measurement. For example, if a prospective 
bidder wanted to be 95% certain that the most the firm could lose on the tender is 5 cents/bushel, 
the constraint would be setup as follows: 
=RiskPercentile(Expected Profit, 0.05) >= -0.5 
This uses a percentile measurement of the distribution of expected profit to determine the 
likelihood of a particular loss potential. This analysis is performed at various confidence 
intervals for both the lowest and highest risk situations.  
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed on strategic variables to showcase the effects of 
strategic variables on the optimal bid. The important concept at hand in the sensitivity analysis is 
that firms may take alternative strategies in competitive bidding, which would result in 
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asymmetric costs and have an impact on the optimal bid for the prospective bidder. Rivals cannot 
observe the strategic play by each competitor prior to the bid submission, so strategic sensitivity 
analysis is crucial to understanding the impact certain variables have on the optimal bid. Table 
4.2 shows the variables on which sensitivity analysis is performed.  
Table 4.2. Sensitivity Analysis Outline 
Variable Base Case Change 
Incoterm Variation Buy Origin & Sell FOB 
Ship 
Buy Delivered & Sell FOB 
Ship 
Buy Origin & Sell CIF 
Destination 
Number of rivals 4 Rivals 2 Rivals & 6 Rivals 
Standard deviation of rival bids 5% 1% & 10% 
Variability in execution of 
futures 
$9.73/bushel (bu.) Rival B – $9.53 
Rival C – $9.48 
Rail coverage All participants covered 
in secondary rail market 
Rival B & D covered in 
primary rail market 
Change in data timeline 2015-2018 data 2013-2014 data 
Demurrage measurement 0% probability of 
occurrence 
50% & 90% probability of 
occurrence 
 
Table 4.3 shows the relevant outputs to be evaluated as a result of the analysis. This 
analysis gives decision makers and prospective bidders the ability to see the impacts of each 
strategic variable and place themselves in a better position to succeed in the competitive bidding 
process.
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Table 4.3. Outputs to be Evaluated 
 
4.6. Data 
A majority of the data collected for the model is historical cost data relating to the 
relevant costs within the supply chain. This data came from a few different industry sources and 
databases. All data is gathered and converted to a weekly format and is represented in US 
dollars/bushel. The reason the data is represented in a weekly format is because it is relevant for 
the timeline of the tendering process and also an accurate interval measure for demurrage 
representation. The list of supply chain variables is as follows: 
• Nearby Soybean Futures 
• Origin Basis (Jamestown, ND) 
• Origin Elevator Margin 
• Pacific Northwest (PNW) Basis 
• PNW Elevator Margin 
• Secondary Rail Market or Daily Car Value (DCV) 
• Primary Rail Market  
• Rail Tariff  
• Demurrage  
• Ocean Freight 
The timeline for the data were strategically chosen to represent specific market 
conditions. The base case and most sensitivity analysis were performed using weekly data from 
Base Case Sensitivities 
Optimal Bid Optimal Bid 
Probability of Winning Tender Probability of Winning Tender 
Expected Profit Expected Profit 
 Probability of Underbidding Certain Rivals 
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2015-2018. This timeline is not only the most relevant, but also has the best representation of 
normal market conditions. During the past 3 years, a majority of agricultural costs were 
relatively stable compared to the years 2013-2014. In order to represent optimal bidding under 
an increase in price volatility, sensitivity analysis was performed using weekly data from 2013-
2014.  
Figures 4.1-4.6 show a graphical representation of the historical timeline of respective 
supply chain costs. It is evident that starting in 2015, most of the costs have experienced less 
volatility compared to years past. When looking specifically at the years 2013-2014, it is 
evident in most of the figures below that there is a noticeable increase in volatility.  
 
  
Figure 4.1. Historical Origin Basis   
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Figure 4.2. Historical PNW Basis Values  
Figure 4.3. Historical Secondary Rail Market Values 
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Figure 4.4. Historical Nearby Soybean Futures Prices  
 
Figure 4.5. Historical Ocean Freight Rates 
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Nearby futures prices were gathered through DTN Prophet X. Historical basis values at 
the origin (Jamestown, ND) were also gathered through DTN Prophet X. Basis values at the 
PNW, secondary rail market values or daily car values (DCV), and ocean freight values were 
provided by Tradewest Brokerage Co. and gathered by Bruce Dahl. Data to represent the 
primary rail market and tariff values were developed by the BNSF Ag Commodity Unit and 
provided to Dr. Wilson. Vessel demurrage values were gathered from industry participants and 
a distribution of potential values was created to accurately represent demurrage. A constant 
number was used to represent elevator margin costs at the origin and PNW. These costs were 
gathered by Dr. Wilson through his working relationship with industry participants.  
Probability density functions are gathered for each of the stochastic variables through 
the distribution fitting feature in @Risk. The stochastic variables used in the model are nearby 
Figure 4.6. Historical Rail Tariff Rates 
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soybean futures, origin basis, PNW basis, secondary rail market values, primary rail market 
values, tariff values, and ocean freight. @Risk has a feature within distribution fitting called 
‘batch fit’ that will fit the data with the appropriate distribution and also create a correlation 
matrix to represent the correlation between each stochastic cost in the model. The distribution 
fitting analysis in @Risk fits the data to a set of predetermined distributions, and ranks each fit 
based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Lastly, the correlation matrix is created for the 
entire data set.  
Table 4.4 shows the best fit distribution chosen for each stochastic variable in the model 
along with the @Risk function used to represent the distribution and a graphical representation 
of each distribution. Distribution fitting of each stochastic variable allows for an accurate 
representation of the data through time and provides accurate means of capturing the price 
volatility of each variable. Rather than assuming a normal distribution for each variable or 
simply using deterministic values, the distribution fitting process in @Risk captures and 
exemplifies the true price volatility of each variable through time. Each distribution shown 
below is represented from 2015-2018 data. The same procedure was performed for the sentivity 
analysis using 2013-2014 data.  
Table 4.5 shows the correlation matrix of the supply chain costs used in the model. This 
is another important input that has a significant effect on the optimal bid. Many of the supply 
chain costs experience volatility because of the same outside factors, whether it be due to 
weather, supply, demand, competition, etc. As a result, many of the supply chain costs become 
correlated both negatively and positively as can be seen in the table. Table 4.6 and 4.7 show the 
same content except using data from 2013-2014. 
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Table 4.4. Supply Chain Variable Distributions for 2015-2018 Data (@Risk) 
 
 
Table 4.5. Supply Chain Variable Correlation Matrix for 2015-2018 Data (@Risk)  
 
 
 
 
 
Name Basis PNW Basis Origin NB Soybean Fut DCV ($/bu) Tariff ($/bu) Ocean Freight ($/bu) Primary ($/bu)
Best Fit (Ranked by AIC)
RiskTriang(0.45384,0.80000,
1.42730) RiskNormal(-0.98091,0.13073)
RiskWeibull(2.3300,1.5495,Ri
skShift(8.3527))
RiskLogLogistic(-
0.22127,0.22102,3.8466)
RiskUniform(1.536811,1.594
618)
RiskTriang(0.25481,0.41590,
0.61819)
RiskLevy(-1.32343e-
007,4.03965e-007)
Mean 0.8937 -0.9809 9.7256 0.0264 1.5657 0.4296 +Infinity
Mode 0.8 -0.9809 9.5707 -0.0288 1.5368 0.4159 2.312E-09
Median 0.8747 -0.9809 9.6766 -0.000243 1.5657 0.4265 7.556E-07
Std. Deviation 0.2014 0.1307 0.6257 0.1365 0.0167 0.0743 +Infinity
Graph
Correlation Basis PNW Basis Origin NB Soybean Fut DCV ($/bu) Tariff ($/bu) Ocean Freight ($/bu) Primary ($/bu)
Basis PNW 1.000
Basis Origin 0.504 1.000
NB Soybean Fut -0.267 -0.576 1.000
DCV ($/bu) 0.169 -0.275 0.323 1.000
Tariff ($/bu) -0.163 -0.328 0.151 -0.055 1.000
Ocean Freight ($/bu) -0.290 -0.428 0.338 0.143 0.636 1.000
Primary ($/bu) 0.314 -0.174 0.244 0.495 0.149 0.376 1.000
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Table 4.6. Supply Chain Variable Distributions for 2013-2014 Data (@Risk) 
 
 
Table 4.7. Supply Chain Variable Correlation Matrix for 2013-2014 Data (@Risk) 
 
 
 
Name Basis PNW Basis Origin NB Soybean Fut DCV ($/bu) Tariff ($/bu) Ocean Freight ($/bu)
Best Fit (Ranked by AIC)
RiskTriang(0.86402,1.4500,2.
3493)
RiskWeibull(7.3085,2.8613,Ri
skShift(-3.5679))
RiskTriang(8.5327,14.7400,1
6.0078)
RiskExpon(0.40074,RiskShift(-
0.075282))
RiskUniform(1.493731,1.551
983)
RiskBetaGeneral(1.1878,3.69
59,0.38684,0.98147)
Mean 1.5545 -0.8854 13.0935 0.3255 1.5229 0.5315
Mode 1.45 -0.7636 14.74 -0.0753 1.4937 0.4256
Median 1.5321 -0.8465 13.3494 0.2025 1.5229 0.5097
Std. Deviation 0.3054 0.433 1.6331 0.4007 0.0168 0.1052
Graph
Correlation Basis PNW Basis Origin NB Soybean Fut DCV ($/bu) Tariff ($/bu) Ocean Freight ($/bu)
Basis PNW 1.000
Basis Origin -0.184 1.000
NB Soybean Fut -0.204 0.019 1.000
DCV ($/bu) 0.521 -0.442 -0.444 1.000
Tariff ($/bu) 0.359 -0.550 -0.538 0.766 1.000
Ocean Freight ($/bu) 0.245 -0.617 -0.340 0.691 0.835 1.000
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4.7. Summary 
This chapter summarizes how a stochastic profit maximization model can be developed 
for optimal bid derivation. The empirical model is explained in detail, stochastic and fixed inputs 
are shown, and the data is explained along with its sources. The base case and each associated 
assumption is explained along with why certain assumptions had to be made. The development 
of the demurrage cost calculation is analyzed in each step along with an explanation of the VaR 
measurement and how it is derived. Lastly, sensitivity analysis is highlighted including the 
reason why each sensitivity is performed on the base case.   
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
5.1. Introduction   
This chapter focuses strictly on the results of the model and the interpretations of them. 
First the base case is analyzed, and results are described. Then all sensitivity analysis is 
described in detail including the impact each analysis component has on the output variables. 
The added cost of demurrage is explained, and results are shown accordingly. Lastly, the 
alternative specification of VaR is revisited and results are explained in detail.  
5.2. Base Case Results 
The base case results are first split up into 3 different tables for graphical representation. 
Table 5.1 shows the results in 20 cent increments. Figure 5.1 shows the graphical layout of these 
results. Although this does not provide the optimal bid, it does show the behavior of each 
variable graphically which is significant. According to these results, the optimal bid will be 
around $11.50/bu. At that bid level, the probability of winning the tender is 13% with an 
expected profit of $0.02/bushel.  
Figure 5.1, however, is more significant in this case. The graphical representation of 
these results shows very evidently that as the bid level increases, the probability of winning 
decreases. The PwTender curve starts off on a fairly flat level, decreases substantially and then 
flattens out again. This concludes that from $10.50-$10.90, the probability of winning is at or 
near 100%. This makes sense due to the fact that the initial cost combination of the base case 
scenario is $11.36/bu.  
If all bidders are symmetric, the chance of any bidder submitting a bid less than that of 
their expected cost is negligible. Because all rival bidders are symmetric in the base case, the 
curves representing the probability of underbidding each rival individually are essentially 
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stacked on top of on another which makes is difficult to differentiate each firm on the graph. It is 
obvious that the PwTender curve is quite a bit lower than that of the curves showcasing the 
probability of underbidding each rival individually. This shows that even though there is a 60% 
chance of underbidding each rival individually, the chance of winning the tender is still quite 
low.  The profit line is simply a linear combination of each potential bid minus cost. It excludes 
the impact of the probability of winning.  
The optimal bid can be observed graphically by finding the maximum of the Expected 
Profit curve. According to figure 5.1, it looks to be right around $11.50 which would match the 
results in table 5.1. Table 5.2 and figure 5.2 show the same results except in 10 cent increments. 
The optimal bid is unchanged along with the probability of winning and expected profit.  
Table 5.3 and figure 5.3 represent the optimal bid when broken down into 1 cent 
increments. The optimal bid is $11.48/bu. The probability of winning the tender at that bid level 
is 15% and the expected profit is $0.019/bu. The expected profit may seem like a minimal value, 
but when participating in an international tender, bid submissions are usually for a volume of 
70,000 metric tons or the equivalent to a vessel. This would equate to a profit of $0.70/metric ton 
or $48,864. 
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Table 5.1. Base Case Results in 20 Cent Increments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$10.50 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% ($0.86) ($0.86) 
$10.70 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% ($0.66) ($0.66) 
$10.90 100% 100% 100% 99% 98% ($0.46) ($0.45) 
$11.10 96% 96% 96% 96% 85% ($0.26) ($0.22) 
$11.30 83% 82% 83% 82% 47% ($0.06) ($0.03) 
$11.50 60% 60% 60% 60% 13% $0.14 $0.02 
$11.70 34% 34% 35% 35% 1% $0.34 $0.00 
$11.90 16% 16% 16% 16% 0% $0.54 $0.00 
$12.10 5% 5% 5% 5% 0% $0.74 $0.00 
$12.30 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% $0.94 $0.00 
Figure 5.1. Base Case Results in 20 Cent Increments  
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Table 5.2. Base Case Results in 10 Cent Increments  
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.00 98% 99% 99% 98% 94% ($0.36) ($0.34) 
$11.10 96% 96% 96% 96% 85% ($0.26) ($0.22) 
$11.20 91% 91% 91% 91% 68% ($0.16) ($0.11) 
$11.30 83% 82% 83% 82% 47% ($0.06) ($0.03) 
$11.40 72% 72% 72% 72% 27% $0.04 $0.01 
$11.50 60% 60% 60% 60% 13% $0.14 $0.02 
$11.60 46% 46% 47% 47% 5% $0.24 $0.01 
$11.70 34% 34% 35% 35% 1% $0.34 $0.00 
$11.80 25% 24% 24% 24% 0% $0.44 $0.00 
$11.90 16% 16% 16% 16% 0% $0.54 $0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Base Case Results in 10 Cent Increments  
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Table 5.3. Base Case Results in 1 Cent Increments 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 66% 66% 66% 66% 19% $0.09 $0.017 
$11.46 65% 65% 65% 65% 18% $0.10 $0.018 
$11.47 63% 64% 64% 64% 16% $0.11 $0.018 
$11.48 62% 62% 62% 62% 15% $0.12 $0.019 
$11.49 61% 61% 61% 61% 14% $0.13 $0.018 
$11.50 60% 60% 60% 60% 13% $0.14 $0.018 
$11.51 58% 58% 59% 58% 12% $0.15 $0.017 
$11.52 57% 57% 57% 57% 11% $0.16 $0.017 
$11.53 56% 56% 56% 56% 10% $0.17 $0.017 
$11.54 54% 55% 55% 54% 9% $0.18 $0.016 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 showcases the impact of each stochastic input variable on the output value of 
the base case. The simulation with the optimal bid of $11.48 is chosen for this figure. PNW basis 
is the input with the most impact on profit followed by origin basis and tariff value. This is an 
important takeaway for prospective bidders, because it exemplifies the impact that each input has 
Figure 5.3. Base Case Results in 1 Cent Increments 
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on the output value. This gives decision makers the ability to understand exactly which inputs are 
the major drivers and which have the least influence on overall expected profits.   
 
 
5.3. Sensitivity – Buy delivered & sell FOB ship 
Table 5.4 and figure 5.5 depict the results of the sensitivity analysis on incoterm 
variation. Table 5.4 is in 1 cent increments and figure 5.5 is in 20 cent increments for graphical 
representation purposes. Instead of purchasing the soybeans from the origin, the soybeans are 
bought delivered and the selling/bidding price is FOB ship. Similar to the base case, 4 rivals are 
assumed to participate along with all of them being symmetric bidders. The rival’s bids are 2% 
over cost with a standard deviation of 5 cents. Due to the change in incoterms, the input variables 
are not the same as the base case. Because the procurement of the soybeans is at the delivered 
phase of the supply chain, origin basis, origin margin, and rail transportation costs are not 
included. This exposes the bidder to less risk potential for optimal bid derivation.  
  
Figure 5.4. Impact of Key Inputs on Output Value (@Risk) 
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Table 5.4. Sensitivity – Buy Delivered & Sell FOB Ship 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$10.70 75% 75% 76% 76% 32% $0.05 $0.016 
$10.71 74% 74% 75% 74% 30% $0.06 $0.018 
$10.72 72% 73% 73% 73% 28% $0.07 $0.020 
$10.73 70% 71% 72% 71% 25% $0.08 $0.020 
$10.74 69% 69% 70% 69% 23% $0.09 $0.021 
$10.75 67% 67% 68% 68% 21% $0.10 $0.022 
$10.76 65% 64% 66% 66% 18% $0.11 $0.020 
$10.77 64% 63% 63% 64% 16% $0.12 $0.019 
$10.78 62% 62% 61% 62% 14% $0.13 $0.019 
$10.79 61% 60% 59% 59% 13% $0.14 $0.018 
 
 
 
The optimal bid in this case is $10.75 with a 21% probability of winning the tender and 
an expected profit of $0.022/bu. As expected, a less complex and lower valued cost structure 
results in a lower optimal bid. However, it is interesting that the probability of winning in this 
case is 6% more than that of the base case. Expected profits are also slightly greater compared to 
the base case. This proves that the less uncertainty there is about rival bids along with the 
Figure 5.5. Sensitivity – Buy Delivered & Sell FOB Ship 
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prospective bidder’s cost structure, the higher the profit potential and probability of winning. 
Because all rivals act as symmetric bidders in this case, it can be assumed that the cost structure 
of the rivals is also of lesser value and lesser risk exposure than that of their cost structure in the 
base case.  
The mean value of the cost structure for the potential bidder in this scenario is $10.65/bu. 
It can be observed in figure 5.5 that the expected profit falls in line with the linear profit function 
up until about $10.70. This would make sense given the prospective bidder’s mean cost value. 
The only stochastic variable included in the derivation of cost in this case is the PNW basis. 
Nearby futures and margin at the PNW are both fixed values. This means that 100% of the 
randomness in the cost derivation for the prospective bidder is caused by volatility in the PNW 
basis value.   
5.4. Sensitivity – Buy Origin and Sell CIF Destination 
Contrary to the strategic sensitivity analysis of buying delivered and selling FOB ship, 
this analysis includes more risk than that of the base case. In this case, the incoterms require the 
bidders to take on risk and cover costs of the product from origin to destination. It is again 
assumed that all bidders act symmetrically, and the rival bidders bid at 2% over cost with a 
standard deviation of 5 cents/bu.  
Table 5.5 shows the results in 1 cent increments. Figure 5.6 shows the same results in 20 
cent increments for better visual representation. It can be observed that in this case the optimal 
bid is $11.91/bu. This is 43 cents/bushel more than that of the base case. The probability of 
winning the tender in this case is 17% with an expected profit of $0.021/bu. 
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Table 5.5. Sensitivity – Buy Origin & Sell CIF Destination 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.85 72% 72% 72% 72% 27% $0.06 $0.016 
$11.86 71% 71% 71% 71% 25% $0.07 $0.018 
$11.87 69% 70% 69% 69% 23% $0.08 $0.019 
$11.88 68% 69% 68% 68% 21% $0.09 $0.019 
$11.89 67% 67% 66% 67% 20% $0.10 $0.020 
$11.90 65% 66% 65% 65% 18% $0.11 $0.020 
$11.91 64% 64% 63% 64% 17% $0.12 $0.021 
$11.92 62% 63% 62% 63% 15% $0.13 $0.020 
$11.93 61% 61% 61% 61% 14% $0.14 $0.019 
$11.94 60% 60% 59% 60% 13% $0.15 $0.019 
 
 
 
The probability of winning and expected profit in this case is slightly greater than that of 
the base case. Even though there is not much difference between the two, this could possibly be 
explained by the correlation that ocean freight has to other input costs along with the impact it 
has on the output value. The cost of ocean freight has a strong positive correlation with the tariff 
rate and nearby futures price. The correlations are 63% and 34%, respectively. The tariff is a 
Figure 5.6. Sensitivity – Buy Origin & Sell CIF Destination 
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stochastic variable used in the cost function. Ocean freight also has a strong negative correlation 
with the origin basis at 42%. Origin basis is another stochastic variable used in the cost function. 
Figure 5.7 shows the impact of the stochastic input variables on the output for this analysis. It 
can be observed that ocean freight has the second smallest impact on the output value. Although 
the impact of ocean freight is not as significant as that of the basis values, it is still important to 
be aware of the impact it has on the overall output.   
 
 
5.5. Sensititvity – Change in Number of Rivals  
In the base case it is assumed that the prosepective bidder is competing against 4 rivals. 
In all reality, without having any past data on soybean tenders and due to the privacy of the 
tender process in the real world, it is uknown exactly how many rivals prospective bidders may 
be competing against. To show the impact of a change in the number of rivals, optimal bids are 
derived with the prospective bidder competing against both 2 and 6 rivals.  
Figure 5.7. Impact of Ocean Freight on Output Value (@Risk) 
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All variables besides the number of rivals are the same as the base case. The bid 
submission is on the terms of buying at the origin and selling FOB ship. The rivals are bidding at 
2% over cost with a standard deviation of 5 cents. The stochastic variables used in the cost 
derivation are origin basis, PNW basis, and tariff rate.   
 Table 5.6 shows the results of the tender when the prospective bidder is bidding against 
only 2 rivals. The optimal bid is $11.55/bu with an expected profit of $0.054/bu and a 28% 
probability of winning the business. Compared to the base case, the optimal bid in this scenario 
is 7 cents higher and the probabilty of winning is nearly doubled. An obvious takeway from this 
sensitivy analysis is that as the number of rivals decreases, the optmial bid increases and so does 
the probablity of winning. Because there wouldn’t be as many competitors, there also wouldn’t 
be as much uncertainty from the standpoint of the prosepective bidder. Figure 5.8 shows the 
graphical representation of the optimal bid derivation when the prosective bidder is competing 
against just 2 rivals.   
Table 5.6. Sensitivity – Change in Number of Rivals to 2 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.50 60% 61% 36% $0.14 $0.050 
$11.51 58% 59% 34% $0.15 $0.051 
$11.52 57% 57% 32% $0.16 $0.052 
$11.53 55% 56% 31% $0.17 $0.052 
$11.54 54% 55% 30% $0.18 $0.053 
$11.55 53% 53% 28% $0.19 $0.054 
$11.56 51% 52% 27% $0.20 $0.053 
$11.57 50% 50% 25% $0.21 $0.052 
$11.58 49% 49% 24% $0.22 $0.052 
$11.59 47% 48% 23% $0.23 $0.052 
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Table 5.7 represents the results of the model when the prospective bidder is competing 
against 6 rivals. Contrary to the analysis of competing against 2 rivals, the optimal bid, 
probability of winning and expected profits decreased compared to the base case results. This 
can be expected given the logic of why the optimal bid increased when the number of rivals 
decreased. The optimal bid in this case is $11.46/bu with an expected profit of $0.009/bu and an 
8% chance of winning the tender. The optimal bid decreased 2 cents compared to the base case, 
the probability of winning was about cut in half and the expected profit decreased by 1 cent or 
the equivalent of $25,718 if submitting a bid for a 70,000 metric ton vessel. Figure 5.9 shows a 
graphical representation of the optimal bid in this case.   
The probability of underbidding each rival individually remained the same as the base 
case, but due to the increase in number of bidders, the probability of winning the tender along 
with expected profits decreased. With each addition of another competitor, not only is one more 
bid being submitted, but more risk is being introduced into the model.  
The main takeaway from the sensitivity analysis of a change in the number of rivals is 
that it indeed does have a significant impact on the optimal bid, probability of winning and 
Figure 5.8. Sensitivity – Change in Number of Rivals to 2 
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expected profit. Without previous tender data and knowing the behavior of rival bidding activity, 
it is unknown exactly how many rivals will participate in the import tender. However, this 
sensitivity analysis provides an idea of the impact each additional rival may have on the optimal 
bid.    
Table 5.7. Sensitivity – Change in Number of Rivals to 6 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwE PwF PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 67% 66% 66% 67% 66% 67% 9% $0.09 $0.008 
$11.46 66% 65% 65% 66% 64% 66% 8% $0.10 $0.009 
$11.47 65% 64% 64% 64% 63% 65% 7% $0.11 $0.008 
$11.48 63% 62% 62% 63% 62% 63% 6% $0.12 $0.007 
$11.49 62% 61% 61% 61% 61% 62% 5% $0.13 $0.007 
$11.50 60% 59% 60% 60% 60% 61% 5% $0.14 $0.006 
$11.51 59% 57% 58% 58% 58% 60% 4% $0.15 $0.006 
$11.52 58% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% 3% $0.16 $0.005 
$11.53 56% 55% 55% 55% 55% 56% 3% $0.17 $0.005 
$11.54 54% 54% 54% 53% 54% 54% 2% $0.18 $0.004 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Sensitivity – Change in Number of Rivals to 6 
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5.6. Sensitivity – Change in Standard Deviation of Rival’s Bids  
One way in which randomness from rival bidders can change is through an increase or 
decrease in the standard deviation of their bid functions. The standard deviation represents the 
uncertainty or risk in the rivals bid derivation. Although the prospective bidder may have an idea 
of what the rivals cost functions are like, he/she may not know how they will behave in respect 
to bid markup values.  
In the base case, it is assumed that all rivals bid at 2% above cost with a standard 
deviation of 5 cents. Just as in previous literature on competitive bidding, a normal market 
markup value was chosen. This markup value is the best estimate that the prospective bidder can 
assume without knowing the exact behavior of rivals or without having any previous tender data 
on their bidding behavior. It is, however, important to know the impact of which a change in the 
standard deviation of rival’s bid functions can have on the optimal bid of the prospective bidder. 
To show this impact, sensitivity analysis is performed with rival’s bid functions having a 
standard deviation of both 1 cent and 10 cents. All variables besides the standard deviation of 
rival bids are equivalent to the base case.  
Table 5.8 represents the results when a standard deviation of 1 cent/bu for rival bids is 
implemented into the model. The optimal bid does not change relative to the base case. The 
probability of wining the tender increases by 1% and expected profit slightly increases as well. 
Less variability in the rivals bid functions means that the prospective bidder is exposed to less 
risk, and therefore will have a slightly higher probability of winning the tender. Although the 
results do not pose a dramatic change compared to the base case, it is important to note that less 
uncertainty in rival bid functions increases the probability of winning along with expected profits 
by a slight margin.  
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Table 5.8. Sensitivity – Change in Standard Deviation of Rival Bids (1 cent) 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 67% 66% 67% 67% 20% $0.09 $0.018 
$11.46 65% 66% 65% 66% 18% $0.10 $0.018 
$11.47 64% 65% 64% 64% 17% $0.11 $0.019 
$11.48 64% 63% 63% 63% 16% $0.12 $0.020 
$11.49 62% 61% 61% 62% 14% $0.13 $0.019 
$11.50 60% 60% 60% 60% 13% $0.14 $0.018 
$11.51 59% 59% 59% 58% 12% $0.15 $0.018 
$11.52 57% 57% 57% 57% 11% $0.16 $0.017 
$11.53 56% 55% 56% 56% 10% $0.17 $0.016 
$11.54 54% 54% 54% 55% 9% $0.18 $0.016 
  
Table 5.9 depicts the results of the model when a standard deviation of 10 cents/bu is 
implemented. The optimal bid was, again, unchanged compared to the base case scenario. The 
probability of winning the tender was also equivalent to that of the base case. The expected profit 
was slightly less than that of the base case, but only by $0.001/bu. These results suggest that a 
5% increase in the standard deviation of the rival bid functions does not have a significant effect 
on the optimal bid or probability of winning and just a slight decrease in the expected profit. 
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Table 5.9. Sensitivity – Change in Standard Deviation of Rival Bids (10 cents) 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 66% 65% 66% 66% 18% $0.09 $0.017 
$11.46 64% 65% 65% 64% 17% $0.10 $0.017 
$11.47 63% 63% 63% 63% 16% $0.11 $0.017 
$11.48 62% 62% 62% 62% 15% $0.12 $0.018 
$11.49 60% 61% 61% 60% 14% $0.13 $0.017 
$11.50 59% 60% 60% 59% 13% $0.14 $0.017 
$11.51 58% 58% 58% 58% 11% $0.15 $0.017 
$11.52 57% 57% 57% 57% 10% $0.16 $0.017 
$11.53 55% 56% 56% 56% 10% $0.17 $0.016 
$11.54 54% 55% 55% 54% 9% $0.18 $0.016 
 
The results of the analysis done on the change in standard deviation of rival bid functions 
suggest that although there was a slight change in output, it was not as significant of a change 
compared to other sensitivity analysis done on the model. An increase (decrease) in uncertainty 
about the bid functions of rivals did result in a slight decrease (increase) in expected profits as 
expected. However, this did not have a significant enough impact that alter the optimal bid in 
either case.  
5.7. Sensitivity – Asymmetric Bidding Environment 
Another way in which randomness and uncertainty can be introduced by rivals is by 
strategic supply chain positioning for optimal bid derivation. Firms may take different strategies 
in cost valuation and bid derivation which would create an asymmetric bidding environment and 
rivals are not able to observe this. The strategic moves that firms can make to better position 
themselves are mainly done within the supply chain of costs from origin to destination. Firms 
can expose themselves to more risk on certain aspects of the supply chain while decreasing risk 
potential on other supply chain components. In the base case, it is assumed that all bidders act in 
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an identical manner, whether that be strategic supply chain positioning or bid markup derivation. 
That may not always be the case in competitive bidding as each firm is constantly trying to 
strategically position themselves ahead of the competition. 
To show the effect of an asymmetrical bidding environment on the prospective bidder’s 
optimal bid, two different scenarios were explored. The first one introduces a variability in the 
execution of the soybean futures market hedge. In the base case, all rivals are assumed to be 
100% hedged in the futures market at the mean value of $9.73/bu. For the sensitivity analysis, 
the assumption that all rivals are 100% hedged is still in place, but a variability in the execution 
of that hedge is changed for 2 rivals. Rival B’s futures execution is 20 cents/bu lower than that of 
the base case and rival C’s futures execution is 25 cents/bu lower than that of the base case.  
Table 5.10 shows the results of the tender with this change in place. The optimal bid is 
decreased by 2 cents/bu, the probability of winning decreased to just 5% and the expected profit 
also decreased to $0.006/bu. More specifically, the probability of underbidding rival B at the 
optimal bid is only 38% compared to a 63% probability of underbidding rival A whom is 
assumed to behave symmetrically with the prospective bidder. The probability of underbidding 
rival C dropped to just 33%. The decrease in the chance of underbidding rivals B and C is the 
main driving force for the decrease in the probability of winning the tender and the noticeable 
decrease in expected profit. Figure 5.10 shows how the probability function of underbidding 
rivals B and C breakaway from the other bidders and drives down the probability of winning the 
tender.   
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Table 5.10. Sensitivity – Change in Rival’s Execution of Futures 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 64% 40% 33% 66% 6% $0.09 $0.005 
$11.46 63% 38% 33% 64% 5% $0.10 $0.006 
$11.47 62% 37% 32% 63% 5% $0.11 $0.005 
$11.48 61% 36% 30% 62% 4% $0.12 $0.005 
$11.49 60% 35% 29% 60% 4% $0.13 $0.005 
$11.50 59% 34% 29% 58% 3% $0.14 $0.005 
$11.51 57% 33% 28% 57% 3% $0.15 $0.005 
$11.52 56% 32% 28% 56% 3% $0.16 $0.004 
$11.53 55% 31% 26% 55% 2% $0.17 $0.004 
$11.54 54% 30% 25% 54% 2% $0.18 $0.004 
       
 
 
Firms can strategically position themselves to form a competitive advantage by 
participating in the primary rail market as opposed to the secondary rail market. Table 5.11 
shows the results of the model when rivals B and D are covered in the primary market and rivals 
A and C are covered in the secondary market. The optimal bid decreases by 1 cent/bu. compared 
to the base case.  
Figure 5.10. Sensitivity – Change in Rival’s Execution of Futures 
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The probability of winning the tender also decreases by 1% and expected profits decrease 
slightly as well compared to the base case. The probability of underbidding the rivals that are 
covered in the primary market is slightly less than that of the rivals that are not at all bid levels. 
This is because coverage in the primary market, in this case, has less risk potential and volatility 
than coverage in the secondary market. This makes rivals B and D more competitive than they 
were in the base case and creates an asymmetrical bidding environment that has effects on the 
optimal bid for the prospective bidder. It should be noted that for this sensitivity, the use of the 
primary rail market excludes the prospective impact of velocity.  
Table 5.11. Sensitivity – Change in Rival’s Rail Coverage   
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 66% 63% 66% 62% 17% $0.09 $0.015 
$11.46 65% 61% 65% 61% 16% $0.10 $0.016 
$11.47 63% 60% 63% 60% 14% $0.11 $0.017 
$11.48 62% 59% 62% 59% 13% $0.12 $0.016 
$11.49 61% 57% 61% 57% 12% $0.13 $0.016 
$11.50 60% 56% 60% 56% 11% $0.14 $0.016 
$11.51 58% 55% 58% 55% 10% $0.15 $0.015 
$11.52 57% 54% 57% 54% 9% $0.16 $0.015 
$11.53 56% 52% 56% 53% 8% $0.17 $0.014 
$11.54 54% 51% 54% 51% 8% $0.18 $0.014 
 
The creation of an asymmetrical bidding environment does indeed have significant 
impacts on optimal bid derivation. Because rivals are unaware of competitor bidding behavior 
and strategic positioning, it makes it difficult for prospective bidders to position themselves 
strategically based on what they think rivals may or may not do for optimal bid formulation. 
However, it is important to realize the impacts that an asymmetrical bidding environment, 
whether it be because of contract price changes or a change in logistical risk coverage, can have 
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on the optimal bid for a prospective bidder. This variability has proven to be more significant 
than that of a change in the standard deviation of rival bid functions. Figure 5.11 depicts a 
graphical representation of this environment.  
 
 
5.8. Sensitivity – Demurrage Measurement  
An added cost that can be extremely significant and can determine the difference between 
indulging in a profit or experiencing the winner’s curse is the cost of demurrage. When a supply 
chain runs efficiently with no bottlenecks, the cost of demurrage is of little concern. On the 
contrary, when bottlenecks are experienced within a supply chain, demurrage can quickly 
become a significant cost and if not accounted for can be detrimental to a firm’s profits. 
However, it is difficult to accurately measure the cost of congestion. To account for the potential 
of an added cost of demurrage, the probability of occurrence at levels of 50%, and 90% were 
included in the model. All other variables remained synonymous to the base case. The added cost 
was not significant to the optimal bid at an occurrence under 50%. Results are shown below in 
table 5.12 for demurrage with a 50% chance of occurrence. The optimal bid increased by 2 
Figure 5.11. Sensitivity – Change in Rival’s Rail Coverage  
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cents/bu to $11.50/bu. The probability of winning the tender stayed the same and expected profit 
did as well. Figure 5.12 shows the impact of demurrage compared to other stochastic variables.   
Table 5.12. Sensitivity – Demurrage Measurement (50% Occurrence)  
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 69% 68% 68% 68% 22% $0.07 $0.016 
$11.46 67% 67% 67% 67% 20% $0.08 $0.017 
$11.47 66% 66% 66% 66% 19% $0.09 $0.018 
$11.48 65% 65% 65% 65% 18% $0.10 $0.018 
$11.49 64% 63% 64% 63% 16% $0.11 $0.018 
$11.50 62% 62% 62% 62% 15% $0.12 $0.019 
$11.51 61% 61% 61% 61% 14% $0.13 $0.018 
$11.52 60% 59% 60% 59% 13% $0.14 $0.018 
$11.53 58% 58% 58% 58% 11% $0.15 $0.017 
$11.54 57% 56% 57% 57% 10% $0.16 $0.017 
  
  
 
Figure 5.12. Impact of Demurrage Cost on Output Value (@Risk) 
 80 
Table 5.13 shows the results when demurrage occurrence is set at a 90% probability. The 
optimal bid again increases by 1 cent/bu this time to $11.52/bu. The probability of winning 
decreased by 1% and the expected profit stayed the same as the sensitivity analysis performed 
with a demurrage occurrence of 50%.   
Table 5.13. Sensitivity – Demurrage Measurement (90% Occurrence) 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$11.45 71% 70% 70% 71% 25% $0.05 $0.013 
$11.46 69% 69% 69% 69% 22% $0.06 $0.014 
$11.47 68% 68% 68% 68% 20% $0.07 $0.014 
$11.48 67% 66% 66% 66% 18% $0.08 $0.014 
$11.49 65% 65% 65% 65% 17% $0.09 $0.015 
$11.50 64% 64% 64% 64% 16% $0.10 $0.015 
$11.51 63% 63% 63% 63% 14% $0.11 $0.015 
$11.52 62% 62% 61% 61% 13% $0.12 $0.016 
$11.53 60% 60% 60% 60% 12% $0.13 $0.015 
$11.54 59% 59% 59% 59% 11% $0.14 $0.015 
 
This added cost creates more uncertainty in optimal bid formulation with respect to the 
prospective bidder as well as his/her rivals. A majority of the time it may be uncertain if 
demurrage will occur, how long it will last, and what the value impacts could be for the firm. 
This is one way in which firms can account for that potential impact and this proves that at a 
probability of 50% occurrence or greater, demurrage will have a significant impact on the 
optimal bid. If demurrage was not accounted for, the optimal bid would be lower, and the 
prospective bidder would likely win the tender. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean the 
bidder would return a profit. He/she could experience the winner’s curse and win the tender but 
end up losing money for the firm due to demurrage penalties.  
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5.9. Sensitivity – Abnormal Market Conditions (2013-2014)  
The final sensitivity performed on the model involves using supply chain cost data from 
the years 2013-2014. The reason this timeline was chosen for sensitivity analysis is because 
those 2 years were years of abnormal market conditions of extreme volatility. There were many 
outside factors that caused price volatility during those years. One of them mentioned in chapter 
2 was the oil boom in western ND that increased rail prices. The BNSF rail line from ND to the 
PNW is crucial for soybean movement to make international trade successful. During the oil 
boom, the rail lines were over worked with oil trains and it became extremely hard to move 
grain. As a result, freight prices rose dramatically. This not only created extreme price volatility 
in both the primary and secondary rail markets, but also created demurrage penalties for market 
participants. Vessels were having to wait at the port for days at a time because the grain was not 
getting to the destination on time.  
To show the impact of an increase in price volatility on the optimal bid, the base case 
model was ran identical to the original except instead of using data during a period of normal 
market conditions (2015-2018), data from 2013-2014 was used. Distributions and correlations 
were created for the new data set just as they were for the original data set. Table 5.14 shows the 
results of the optimal bid derivation with use of the new data. The optimal bid as a result of the 
model is $15.94/bu. with a 14% probability of winning the tender and an expected profit of 
$0.028/bu or $72,010 if submitting a bid for a 70,000 metric ton vessel.  
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Table 5.14. Sensitivity – Abnormal Market Conditions (2013-2014 Data) 
Bid 
Level 
PwA PwB PwC PwD PwTender Profit Expected 
Profit 
$15.90 64% 64% 64% 64% 17% $0.16 $0.026 
$15.91 63% 63% 63% 63% 16% $0.17 $0.027 
$15.92 62% 62% 62% 62% 15% $0.18 $0.027 
$15.93 61% 62% 61% 62% 14% $0.19 $0.027 
$15.94 60% 61% 61% 61% 14% $0.20 $0.028 
$15.95 60% 60% 60% 60% 13% $0.21 $0.027 
$15.96 59% 59% 59% 59% 12% $0.22 $0.027 
$15.97 58% 58% 58% 59% 12% $0.23 $0.027 
$15.98 58% 58% 57% 58% 11% $0.24 $0.026 
$15.99 57% 57% 57% 57% 10% $0.25 $0.025 
    
The probability of winning in this scenario is almost the same percentage as that of the 
original base case. This shows that an increase in volatility doesn’t necessarily have a dramatic 
impact on the probability of winning if all bidders are competing in the same bidding 
environment. However, due to an increase in prices and price volatility, expected profits rose 
compared to the original base case. This means an increase in volatility does create opportunity 
for increased profits. However, demurrage was not accounted for in this situation. As previously 
mentioned, this timeframe was a prime example of a peak demurrage potential that may have had 
detrimental impacts on firms bidding in international soybean tenders.  
5.10. Alternative Specification – VaR Analysis  
An important and impactful alternative specification is included in the model for risk 
management purposes. A VaR analysis is performed on the model in both low and high-risk 
situations to capture the ability to measure and manage potential loss while deriving optimal bids 
for international import tenders. As mentioned previously, VaR is a financial risk measure that is 
used to quantify the level of risk for a given situation. In the case of competitive bidding, VaR is 
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implemented to measure the maximum loss potential for a firm looking to submit a bid in an 
international soybean tender. The incoterm with the lowest risk and uncertainty – buy delivered 
and sell FOB ship – and that with the highest level of uncertainty – buy origin and sell CIF 
destination – are used for VaR analysis. Table 5.15 shows the results of the VaR analysis 
performed on the low risk scenario.  
Table 5.15. Alternative Specification – VaR Low Risk Situation 
LOW RISK (Buy Delivered & Sell FOB Ship) 
Bid 
Level 
Confidence 
Interval 
Expected 
Profit/Loss 
VaR 
Result 
10.75 99% -0.1 -0.0753 
10.75 90% -0.05 -0.0391 
10.75 95% -0.05 -0.0543 
10.74 95% -0.05 -0.044 
 
First, Monte Carlo simulation is used to derive the optimal bid just as in the original base 
case scenario. After the optimal bid is derived, then the VaR analysis is implemented as 
explained previously in chapter 4. Results are derived for confidence levels of 90%, 95%, and 
99%. With 99% confidence, the most the prospective bidder could lose at a bid level of 
$10.75/bu. is 7.53 cent/bu. At 90% confidence, the most the prospective bidder could lose at a 
bid level of $10.75/bu. is 3.91 cents/bu. This can also be interpreted as there being a 10% chance 
if the prospective bidder submits a bid of $10.75, he/she will lose more than 3.91 cents/bu. 
Notice at the 95% confidence level there is an expected maximum loss target of 5 
cents/bu. At a bid level of $10.75/bu, that maximum target is exceeded. The VaR result yields a 
potential loss of 5.43 cents/bu. If there was a requirement by a firm that stated they could not 
submit a bid with a VaR result exceeding potential loss of 5 cents/bu at 95% confidence, then the 
firm would be forced to decrease their bid to $10.74/bu. to meet that specification. That is an 
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example of how VaR analysis can efficiently and effectively be implemented into the 
competitive bidding process.      
Table 5.16 yields the results of the VaR analysis for the high-risk situation. They are 
similar to that of the low risk, except the optimal bid level is obviously different to accommodate 
for the higher cost values. The VaR result at 99% confidence is 1.5 cents closer to its constraint 
in the high-risk scenario compared to the low-risk scenario. Once again, the maximum potential 
loss was exceeded at the 95% confidence level and the optimal bid had to be decreased by 2 
cents/bu. in order to meet that constraint. VaR analysis proves to be a powerful alternative 
specification that can be implemented into the optimal bid derivation process in order to 
accurately measure and manage potential uncertainty.     
Table 5.16. Alternative Specification – VaR High Risk Situation  
HIGH RISK SCENARIO (Buy Origin & Sell CIF Destination) 
Bid 
Level 
Confidence 
Interval 
Expected 
Profit/Loss 
VaR 
Result 
11.91 99% -0.1 -0.09 
11.91 90% -0.05 -0.044 
11.91 95% -0.05 -0.058 
11.93 95% -0.05 -0.0451 
 
5.11. Summary 
The model in this study is created to address all uncertainty bidders are exposed to when 
participating in the competitive bidding process. Risk exposure comes from uncertainty in own 
costs, competitor costs, and competitor bid levels. Base case results are discussed in this chapter. 
The main output variables examined are optimal bid level, probability of winning, and expected 
profit. The implication of each result on the output variables is explained in the chapter. Lastly, 
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results of the alternative specification are analyzed along with how the specification can be used 
for firm risk metric purposes.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter revisits the problem statement and explains the issues faced by prospective 
bidders looking to participate in the competitive bidding process. A review of the background 
research is then summarized. The empirical model is described along with key results. Important 
implications from the results are included in this chapter. Lastly contributions to literature, 
limitations, and opportunities for further research are discussed.  
6.2. Problem Statement   
Although buyer’s auctions prove to be an effective and efficient manner of conducting 
business, they can often pose uncertainty for sellers in a few different ways. In regard to 
privatized, sealed-bid tenders, prospective bidders are not aware of their competition at all. They 
do not know how many rivals they will be competing against, and they also do not know the cost 
structure of those rivals. The optimal bid for a prospective bidder will be altered based on the 
number of rivals alone. The rivals will also likely be strategically positioning themselves in a 
manner to try and gain a competitive advantage over the competition and this is something 
prospective bidders are not able to observe. This creates a framework of uncertainty that can be 
difficult to capture.   
 Another risk faced by prospective bidders is uncertainty around their own cost structure. 
Price volatility occurs throughout the supply chain at many stages. Whether that be in 
commodity procurement or logistics, costs are always changing, and market participants are 
faced with uncertainty due to the volatility of those costs. Unrecognized costs, such as demurrage 
penalties can also arise and have detrimental effects on firm profits.  
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A supply chain at an international level is susceptible to experience bottlenecks at some 
point. Where the bottlenecks occur, when they occur, and how long they last can often be hard to 
define. This creates rise to possible demurrage penalties which, depending on the contract terms, 
may have to be paid by the seller.  
If a prospective bidder underestimates cost, he/she will likely be the lowest bidder and 
win the tender. However, if costs exceed revenue in the case of the tender, the bidder will lose 
money on the business transaction and experience the winner’s curse. At the same time, sellers 
want to the lowest-cost supplier and win the business. If they are including a cost of congestion, 
they may overestimate cost in cases where demurrage penalties do not occur and end up bidding 
higher than rivals.  
Another problem faced by prospective bidders involved in the competitive bidding 
process is the lack of an overall risk measurement to capture the exposure and potential profit 
and loss opportunity for a firm. Because the process of international tenders involves a large 
volume of a commodity to be traded, the slightest change in price at any stage can have a large 
impact on the sellers’ profit potential. Previous literature does not include a way in which firms 
can measure overall risk exposure and interpret that exposure in a dollar amount. Lastly, optimal 
bid derivation for international import tenders is a complex framework that may be difficult for 
suppliers to understand. The risks and costs experienced throughout the supply chain can be 
difficult to encapsulate and include in optimal bid formulation.  
6.3. Supply Chain Management in Agriculture Overview 
Chapter 2 describes supply chain management in agriculture and its importance. A supply 
chain is depicted, and each element is described. The associated risks of each supply chain 
element are also explained and mitigation techniques for those risks are highlighted as well. 
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Important studies regarding supply chain uncertainty are described along with their results and 
implications. The flow of agricultural products throughout a supply chain is presented. The flow 
and processes of which commodities move throughout the supply chain is important for market 
participants to understand. With that, comes a better understanding of the supply chain risks that 
can arise. 
The logistical rail cost and pricing mechanisms are also described in chapter 2. This 
includes pricing related to the tariff value, primary rail market and secondary rail market. The 
other logistical cost involved in the soybean supply chain is ocean freight.  
A main focus of this study is that of congestion, the impacts it has, and measures that can 
be taken to account for it within the supply chain. Chapter 2 discusses previous literature on 
supply chain congestion modeling techniques. The chapter also highlights important and 
impactful industry examples of supply chain congestion along with the implications and lasting 
effects the congestion caused for market participants.  
6.4. Competitive Bidding Overview 
Chapter 3 focuses on explaining the competitive bidding process and its application to 
agriculture. Seminal work is first explained to set the stage for the evolution of the competitive 
bidding process. This includes studies by Friedman, Gates, Carr, and others. Although these 
studies are not directly tied to the agricultural industry, it is important to know the foundation of 
which competitive bidding evolved. This also shows that competitive bidding is a powerful 
business marketing technique that is used in many different industries such as construction 
projects and online product auctions.  
Common auction types within the competitive bidding framework are discussed along 
with the differences between each auction type. A structured example of an international 
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agricultural import tender process is explained in detail. The General Authority for Supply 
Commodities (GASC) is an economic entity in Egypt that structures and holds international 
wheat import tenders on a regular basis. Having access to information of this process helps shape 
the idea of what more privatized import tenders may be like. It also helps to build a picture of the 
competitive bidding process from start to finish.  
In application to competitive bidding in agriculture, there were 3 studies examined. 
Crespi and Sexton (2004), performed a study on competitive bidding by analyzing the bidding 
behavior of beef processing plants that bid for cattle in the Texas Panhandle. Wilson and Dierson 
(2001), studied the strategic positioning of suppliers participating in international wheat import 
tenders. In the third study, Wilson and Dahl (2001), studied competitive bidding in the case of 
minor oilseeds. The application of competitive bidding in agriculture is important to examine in 
order to prove the many different ways in which this business marketing technique is 
implemented into the industry. Each implementation of competitive bidding in agriculture is 
unique to its underlying purpose or commodity, but all have many of the same foundational 
aspects that can be analyzed as a whole.  
Lastly, a study of competitive bidding that included a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint was 
explained in detail. Takano, Ishii and Muraki (2014), developed a stochastic dynamic 
programming model to analyze competitive bidding. They included a VaR constraint in the 
model to measure potential risk exposure. The constraint proved to be significant in the model 
and was used as a risk measurement tool for potential loss exposure in the competitive bidding 
process.  
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6.5. Empirical Results  
A stochastic profit-maximization model is the core framework of the model presented in 
this study. Historical industry cost data was collected, distributions were fit for each cost, and 
correlations were assigned between each cost variable. From there, the framework is set up to 
stochastically optimize expected profit for a given set of inputs. The framework stems from a 
profit function developed by Friedman: 
E(x) = (X – C) ۰ P(x) 
Where E(x) is the expected profit, X is the bid level submitted, C is expected cost and P(x) is the 
probability of underbidding all competitors.   
The bid level associated with the maximum expected profit would be considered the 
optimal bid and should be the bid that the prospective bidder submits for the tender. Monte Carlo 
simulation is used to solve the model. A simulation table is created at various bid levels and 
5,000 iterations are ran at each bid level to determine the optimal bid for the tender.  
The base case scenario assumes symmetric bidding. 4 rivals are competing against a 
prospective bidder and all participants are assumed to have the same cost structure. The rivals 
bid formulation is 2% over cost with a standard deviation of 5 cents/bu. This creates a symmetric 
bidding environment in which sensitivity analysis can be conducted from. The incoterms for the 
base case scenario are buying the soybeans at the origin (ND) and selling/bidding them FOB 
ship. This means that the buyer would assume responsibility once the beans are loaded onto a 
vessel to be sent to a foreign destination.  
Sensitivity analysis is then conducted on strategic variables included in the competitive 
bidding framework. The important concept overarching all of the sensitivity analysis procedures 
is that in this competitive bidding environment, firms are able to strategically place themselves in 
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positions of leverage over competition and rivals are not able to do observe that. There is more 
than one way in which firms are able to do so and that is exploited in the analysis. The analysis 
also shows the impact that incoterm variation, change in the number of rivals, and costs of 
congestion can have on the optimal bid, expected profits and probability of winning. Lastly, an 
alternative specification of VaR analysis is included as a separate piece in the model. The VaR 
measure is set as a constraint on the optimization of expected profits in order to measure the 
potential loss that can be experienced due to uncertainty in the model.  
The optimal bid in the base case scenario was $11.48/bu. with a 15% chance of winning 
the tender and an expected profit of $0.019/bu. This can be interpreted as if a prospective bidder 
were to bid $11.48/bu. there would be a 15% chance given the number of rivals and their cost 
structure is as assumed in the model, the prospective bidder would win the tender. If that were to 
happen, the prospective bidder would obtain an expected profit of $0.019/bu. or 70 cents/metric 
ton. Most tender bids are submitted on terms of a 70,000 metric ton vessel, so in that case the 
final expected profit would be $48,864. There were 3 stochastic variables included in the base 
case. They were: 
 1. PNW Basis 
 2. Origin Basis 
 3. Tariff Value 
Of those 3 costs, the PNW basis had the greatest impact on the output followed by the 
origin basis and lastly the tariff value.  
Results of all sensitivity analysis are displayed in table 6.1. The first sensitivity 
performed on the model was a variation in incoterms. The base case had incoterms of buying the 
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soybeans at the origin and selling/bidding them FOB ship. The two other incoterms included in 
the sensitivity analysis are: 
 1. Buy Delivered & Sell FOB Ship 
 2. Buy Origin & Sell CIF Destination 
All variables remained synonymous with the base case other than costs that needed to be 
changed to accommodate each incoterm variation. As expected, the first incoterm’s optimal bid 
was less than that of the base case and the second incoterm’s optimal bid was greater than that of 
the base case. This sensitivity showed the impact of a variation in buyer/seller cost and risk 
responsibility on the optimal bid. 
The next sensitivity done on the base case model was a change in the number of rivals. 
Because most international import tenders are a privatized and operate with a sealed-bid 
procedure, it is impossible to know exactly how many competitors that prospective bidders will 
have. The results show the impact of a change in the number of rivals to the output variables. As 
expected, a decrease in number of rivals increases the optimal bid and an increase in number of 
rivals decreases the optimal bid. Just a cut and addition of 2 rivals relative to the base case 
resulted in significant impacts on the output variables.  
A change in standard deviation of rival bid functions did not have a major impact on the 
output variables. However, it is still important to realize that asymmetric bidding does have an 
impact on results and should be taken into consideration when deriving an optimal bid. Without 
information on rivals or data of previous bidding behavior, this measurement is hard to gauge.  
The other way in which an asymmetrical bidding environment can arise is through a 
change in cost structure of rivals. This was shown in analysis of changes in futures execution 
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along with primary rail market coverage. The results yielded a more significant impact than 
those of a change in standard deviation of rival bid functions.  
The analysis of demurrage penalties with probability of occurrence greater than 50% 
proved to have a significant impact on output variables. Even though this cost may be negligible 
a majority of the time, it is crucial to include in an optimal bidding estimation. This is a cost that 
if unaccounted for, could make the decision between slight profits and extreme losses. Lastly, 
sensitivity analysis was conducted using data representing abnormal market conditions. Results 
showed an optimal bid increase to account for increased cost estimation. The expected profit also 
increased, but probability of winning remained about the same.  
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Table 6.1. Sensitivity Analysis Summary  
Sensitivity Optimal Bid 
($/bu) 
Expected Profit 
($/bu) 
Probability of 
Winning (%) 
 
BASE CASE  $11.48 $0.019 15% 
Buy Delivered & 
Sell FOB Ship 
$10.75 $0.022 21% 
Buy Origin & Sell 
CIF Destination 
$11.91 $0.021 17% 
# of rivals = 2 $11.55 $0.054 28% 
# of rivals = 6 $11.46 $0.009 8% 
Standard Deviation 
of Rival Bid = 1 
cent 
$11.48 $0.020 16% 
Standard Deviation 
of Rival Bid = 10 
cents 
$11.48 $0.018 15% 
Change in Futures 
Execution by Rivals 
B & C 
$11.46 $0.006 5% 
Rivals B & D 
Covered in 
Primary Rail 
Market 
$11.47 $0.017 14% 
Demurrage – 50% 
chance of 
occurrence 
$11.50 $0.019 15% 
Demurrage – 90% 
chance of 
occurrence 
$11.52 $0.016 13% 
2013-2014 Market 
Conditions 
$15.94 $0.028 14% 
 
VaR analysis is utilized as an alternative specification on the optimal bidding model. The 
analysis is done in both a low and high-risk competitive bidding situation. The optimal bid is 
first derived for each scenario and then the VaR constraint is implemented. Results varied 
depending on the confidence level set in place. This measurement tool proves to be extremely 
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impactful in measuring and managing overall uncertainty in competitive bidding. It can be 
utilized in a business environment as a risk metric in order to measure maximum loss and risk 
exposure. It is also easy to interpret and understand which makes it all the more useful for 
industry participants.  
6.6. Implications of Results 
It can be easy to get caught up in the specific value determination portions of this study 
without grasping the true takeaway and implications as a result of the study. This analysis was 
performed with the intention of precisely and accurately depicting a soybean supply chain from 
ND to Asia and implementing the elements of that supply chain into a competitive bidding 
model. Although the optimal bid value(s) of the base case and sensitivity analysis are important, 
the end goal was not to focus strictly on those values. Instead, this study was performed to 
provide information on strategic inputs, along with a well-defined model for optimal bid 
derivation to be used in agricultural import tenders. Competitive bidding on an international level 
in privatized tenders exposes bidder to a very dynamic and uncertain bidding environment. This 
study encapsulates the uncertainty involved in the process and draws conclusions for various 
bidding scenarios. An alternative specification of valued risk measurement is also included in the 
study to help with risk management.   
The results indicate that a change in the number of rivals, change in incoterms, 
asymmetrical bidding environments, demurrage occurrence, and abnormal market conditions do 
indeed have a significant impact on the optimal bid for prospective bidders looking to participate 
in competitive bidding. The impact of each change in input to output variables varies as the 
results show.  
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The main implication that can be made for prospective bidders given the results is that in 
order to compete and succeed in competitive bidding, firms must either be low cost suppliers or 
differentiate themselves in such a way that they gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. 
Although the sensitivity analysis can provide insight into which variables create the most 
uncertainty and are the most impactful, there is no concrete answer to guarantee success and 
profit for a firm looking to participate in competitive bidding. Firms must be low cost suppliers if 
they want to be competitive in international import tenders. The business marketing process of 
competitive bidding creates an environment of intense competition and low-cost suppliers will 
always succeed in buyer’s auctions. However, if a firm is able to differentiate themselves in such 
a way that they gain a competitive advantage over rivals, they may be able to form a business 
relationship with customers and avoid the competitive bidding process.  
6.7. Contributions to Literature 
A majority of competitive bidding literature uses previous tender data and rival bidding 
behavior to create a model and generate results. This thesis aims to address situations in which 
historical tender data is not available nor is the bidding behavior of competitors. This creates 
more uncertainty for prospective bidders and this study aimed to encapsulate that uncertainty, 
formulate it into a working model in order to generate results. 
Other than the study done by Takano et al. (2014), there has not been any literature 
written about competitive bidding that includes risk management techniques. Most literature 
focuses solely on profit maximization and fails to address the importance of uncertainty and the 
potential impact that it can have on firm profits. The study included an alternative specification 
of VaR analysis to address and measure the impacts that uncertainty can have on firm profits. 
This management technique is powerful in the realm of competitive bidding because firms are 
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submitting bids in hopes to gain business of large volume and value. A slight change in price can 
alter a firm’s profit potential greatly, which makes it important to be able to quantify the 
uncertainty that firms face when participating in international import tenders.  
In relation to agriculture, there has not been an abundance of studies performed relating 
to competitive bidding, especially at an international scale. This study contributes to literature by 
focusing specifically on international agricultural import tenders and creating a framework which 
can be used for competitive bidding in that environment. Global trade in agriculture continues to 
grow and import tenders continue to be a prominent way of conducting business. A study that 
can be utilized for cost formulation, optimal bid estimation, and risk measurement and 
management in the agricultural industry proves to be a contributing asset to the literature. 
6.8. Limitations  
This study is limiting in that it focuses solely on a specific supply chain for a specific 
commodity. It does not include the impact of other supply chains procuring the same commodity 
to the same destination. Regarding the use of the primary rail market, this study does not include 
the prospective impact of velocity on primary rail values due to a lack of data availability. Lastly, 
this study does not include precise measurement of demurrage penalties at all stages of the 
supply chain.  
6.9. Further Research 
There are a few opportunities for further research regarding this topic. First, more 
analyzation and model creation could be attributed to the measurement of demurrage and 
congestion costs. Due to the scope of this study, a relatively simple demurrage measurement was 
put in place to show the overall impact on competitive bidding. Modeling techniques such as that 
of a queuing model can be introduced and incorporated into competitive bidding to better 
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estimate the impact of demurrage on optimal bids, expected profit, and the probability of 
winning.  
Another opportunity for further research would be to include the impact of various types 
of grain contracting. This thesis focuses on the use of a fixed/forward contract and does not 
include the possibility of bidders procuring the commodity via other contract types (basis, hedge-
to-arrive, delayed price, etc.).  
Lastly, this framework provides the opportunity for further research on competitive 
bidding of other commodities and/or services. Whether it be oilseeds, corn, wheat, rice, a 
construction project or any other commodity or service that is traded through competitive 
bidding, there is opportunity to incorporate that into this study.  
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